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Chapter 1: Introduction 2
This year the productivity of labor, defined as real gross domestic product (GDP) per hours worked, is expected
to be on average 250 percent higher in OECD countries than it was in 1960, and 20 percent higher relative
than the level in 2000. For Germany, the expected increase since 2000 amounts to about 9 percent (OECD,
2016). Labor productivity is a key factor of economic well-being, and it affects the distribution of income
within societies. It is therefore apparent that understanding the driving forces of workers’ productivity is highly
relevant to policy makers in a social market economy as well as to all other actors on the labor market such as
social partners and administrations.
It is an undisputed fact that individual characteristics like cognitive abilities, educational attainment and experi-
ence determine the productivity of individual workers. However, their productivity also depends on the context
they are working in, for example the technology or the amount of capital that is available or labor market insti-
tutions. Further important characteristics of the environment are discussed by different strands of literature.
One such environmental characteristic is the composition of the labor force to which a worker belongs. It
refers to the imperfect substitutability of labor. This literature emphasizes that workers are heterogeneous
with respect to their skills and abilities and that skills and abilities of different workers may complement each
other. It implies that not only the level of skills and abilities determine their value, but also the individual set
compared to the skills and abilities of other workers. Following standard neoclassical theory, an individual
worker is more productive the more unique her relevant individual skills and abilities are. Recently, this idea
has gained increasing attention as it has important implications with regard to two trends which affect labor
supply in several countries today, and in the future: migration and demographic change. In a debate on the
impact of migration on wages, some scholars emphasize the necessity of taking into account that immigrants
and native workers may complement each other (e.g., Ottaviano/Peri, 2012; Haas et al., 2013; Alesina et al.,
2016). Other scholars stress the imperfect substitutability of workers with respect to the skill level (e.g., Moretti,
2004a; Ciccone/Peri, 2006). Still others, focus on the imperfect substitutability of workers that differ in age
(e.g., Card/Lemieux, 2001; Morin, 2015; Garloff/Roth, 2016). My first paper, chapter 2 of this dissertation,
adds to this literature.
There are good reasons to believe that differently aged workers complement each other in the production pro-
cess. Referring to the concept of ‘fluid’ and ‘crystallized intelligence’, the psychologists John L. Horn and
Raymond B. Cattell showed in a joint paper published in 1967 that comparative advantages exist between dif-
ferently aged people. While young people are especially stronger in generating and recombining new knowl-
edge, older people tend to have more experience and abilities to understand difficult situations as well as to use
and apply existing skills. Younger people also typically have more physical strength and agility.
In Germany, like in many other European countries, demographic change will lead to a shift in the age structure
of the workforce in the next decades. The imperfect substitutability of differently aged workers may have
important implications for the relative productivity of age groups in the future. The aim of my first paper is to
quantify the degree of complementarity of workers who differ in age. I estimate cross factor price elasticities
which indicate how productivity of one age group changes in response to a change in the quantity of workers
belonging to another age group. This not only enables the assessment of the impact of demographic change
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on (relative) productivity of differently aged workers, but also the impact of any policy affecting relative labor
supply, e.g., changes in retirement age.
In contrast to most previous studies on age complementarities which refer to the aggregate level, I analyze the
imperfect substitutability of differently aged workers directly where production takes place, i.e., within firms.
By estimating the parameters characterizing establishments’ demand for workers of different age using micro
data, I avoid ‘ecological fallacy’ resulting from interpreting aggregate results as if they pertain to behavior of
firms. My analysis is based on a unique linked employer-employee data set capturing a 20 percent random
sample of German establishments operating in 2012. I generated this data set based on the IAB employment
history (BeH) which contains information on individual spells of employment in Germany. Taking into account
the skill level of the workers, I analyze age complementarities within groups of low, medium, and high skilled
workers by estimating translog cost functions. Thereby, I impose less restrictions on the estimated elasticities
as compared with using CES-functions, which are often estimated in this context.
A second characteristic of a worker’s environment that impacts on productivity is the local labor market. In
Germany, there are not only marked differences in labor productivity between East and West Germany, but also
on a more disaggregated level as reflected in significant regional wage disparities. The latter are a worldwide
phenomenon.
The productivity effect of the local labor market was noted already by List (1838), Roscher (1878), and Mar-
shall (1890) in the 19th century. In the recent literature, some scholars focus on benefits of working in a local
labor market with a specialization in high-skilled labor (e.g., Moretti, 2004a; Ciccone/Peri, 2006; Heuermann,
2011). Local high-skilled labor is discussed as a factor that increases productivity of all workers within the
labor market due to human capital externalities and the imperfect substitutability of differently skilled workers.
Other scholars emphasize the productivity effect of the size of the local labor market, e.g., in terms of total
regional employment (e.g., Ciccone/Hall, 1996; Glaeser/Maré, 2001; Combes et al., 2008). This strand of liter-
ature distinguishes static and dynamic agglomeration economies. Static agglomeration economies are supposed
to result in an immediate productivity increase if a worker migrates form a small non-urban to a large urban
labor market. The underlying mechanisms refer to, inter alia, sharing gains from variety and individual spe-
cialization, better matches between job seekers and vacancies, and improved production processes. Dynamic
agglomeration economies let the productivity of workers increase over time, resulting in an urban wage growth
premium. Two underlying mechanisms are discussed. One suggests that workers’ opportunities to change jobs
are larger in large labor markets than in small labor markets. The matching quality between workers and firms
therefore further increases over time especially in urban labor markets. The second mechanism refers to learn-
ing externalities. It is argued that local learning opportunities based on meeting other workers and exchanging
knowledge are larger in agglomerated labor markets than elsewhere because of the larger number of workers
with different knowledge and ideas one can learn from. My second paper, chapter 3 of this dissertation, focuses
on this channel which was already emphasized by List (1838).
If labor market size fosters the individual accumulation of human capital, this should reflect in the value of
acquired work experience and future productivity, meaning that the productivity of a worker is higher the larger
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the labor markets were in which he or she previously acquired experience. Recent studies confirm this hy-
pothesis (e.g., Andersson et al., 2014; D’Costa/Overman, 2014; De la Roca/Puga, 2016; Matano/Naticchioni,
2016). They show that individuals who previously worked in the largest cities of a country receive higher wages
today than other workers, all other things being equal. However, these studies do not provide general results
on this issue. The main contribution of my second paper therefore is to estimate the elasticity of wage with
respect to the size of the labor markets in which an individual worker previously acquired work experience. I
identify transitions to full-time employment within the period 2005 to 2011 and analyze the wages associated
with these new employment relationships. I take into account each previous spell of employment in order to
identify where the respective worker so far acquired experience. The information is provided by the Integrated
Employment Biographies (IEB) of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).
Taken together, the contribution of this dissertation to the ongoing discussions with regard to the determinants
of labor productivity is twofold. Chapter 2 focuses on age complementarities, meaning that the individual
productivity of a worker depends on his or her age relative to the age of the co-workers. Chapter 3 examines to
which extent labor productivity of employees depends on the size of the labor market in which experience was
acquired, referring to dynamic agglomeration economies with a focus on learning externalities. Both papers
contain empirical analyses for which I used the statistical software Stata 13 and 14 (StataCorp LLC). The papers
are self-contained and single authored. However, I have benefited from very helpful remarks and suggestions
from especially my supervisors Professor Dr. Annekatrin Niebuhr and Professor Dr. Johannes Bröcker as well
as from seminar participants at the IEB/UEA Summer School in Urban Economics 2016, the Annual Meeting
of the German Economic Association (VfS) 2015, the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), the Institute
for Regional Research, ifo Dresden, and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW). The main findings of
both papers are summarized in chapter 4.
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Do age complementarities affect labor
productivity? Evidence from German firm
level data
This chapter has been published as Economics Working Paper No. 2016-10, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu
Kiel, Department of Economics, URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168033.
An earlier version has been published in the series ‘Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpoli-
tik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Empirical Labor Economics’, URL:
https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/112941.
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2.1 Introduction
In the next decades, Germany, as well as many other European countries, will face a shift in the age structure
of the workforce due to demographic change. According to a labor market projection commissioned by the
Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the labor force aged 15 to 24 years will decline from 2010 to
2030 by almost one million persons, and the labor force aged 25 to 54 years by almost five million. On the
contrary, the labor supply of workers older than 55 years will increase by almost three million individuals
(BMAS, 2013). Considering a certain degree of complementarity between the workers of each group, it is to be
expected that such a shift in age structure leads to downward pressure on the productivity, and thereby on the
wage rate, of older workers because their share in total employment increases. In contrast, the productivity and
the wage rate of younger and middle aged workers presumably will increase since they become relatively rare.
Quantitatively, these effects depend on the degree of complementarity between workers that are of a different
age. The larger the degree of complementarity between them, the larger is the effect of demographic change on
the (relative) productivity of age groups.
Complementary relationships between differently aged workers are supposed to exist as the sets of characteris-
tics relevant in the production process differ across younger and older workers (Garloff/Roth, 2016). Younger
workers are stronger in generating and recombining new knowledge, as found by Horn and Cattell (1967) who
refer to this as ‘fluid intelligence’. Furthermore, they typically have more physical strength and agility. In
contrast, older workers tend to have more experience and abilities to understand difficult situations as well as
to use and apply existing skills, i.e., ’crystallized intelligence’ (Horn/Cattell, 1967; Börsch-Supan/Weiss, 2007;
Börsch-Supan, 2013). Empirical results by, e.g., Göbel and Zwick (2013) support that differences in abilities
cause complementarities between younger and older workers. Based on German linked employer-employee
data, they find that the productivity of younger and older workers in establishments with mixed-age working
teams is significantly higher than in other establishments. They relate the productivity gains to the knowledge
exchange between different age groups and to benefits of sharing tasks according to comparative advantages
(Göbel/Zwick, 2013).
In this paper, I quantify the degree of complementarity of workers that belong to different age groups by
estimating cross factor price elasticities. These indicate how the wage rate of age group i changes due to
a change in the quantity of workers that belong to age group j. This is of special interest, as it provides
information on the impact of demographic change, as well as of any policy that impacts on relative labor
supply, such as changes in retirement age, on relative wages. Based on the estimated elasticities, I thereby
apply model calculations and show how the expected demographic change might impact on relative wages of
younger, middle aged, and older workers in Germany.
In contrast to most previous papers, my analysis is based on a linked employer-employee data set. This allows
the investigation of age complementarities on establishment level, i.e., directly at the workplace. It is likely that
this yields better estimates of the parameters characterizing establishments’ labor demand than aggregate data
(Hamermesh, 1996). Most other studies analyze complementarities between different groups of workers using
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data referring to the regional or national level. These studies might suffer from ecological fallacy as aggregate
results are interpreted as if they pertain to behavior of firms (see discussion by, e.g., Naz et al., 2015).
Taking into account the interaction of skill and age, I analyze age complementarities on the establishment level
within groups of low, medium, and high skilled workers by estimating translog cost functions. Thereby, I
impose less restrictions on the elasticities as compared with using CES-functions, which are often used in this
context. One basic assumption of a CES-function is that the elasticity between any two groups of workers that
differ in age is the same, independently of how old the workers within the two groups are. In contrast, I provide
empirical evidence that the degree of complementarity varies between age groups.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2.2 I review the related literature. In section 2.3
I describe the theoretical framework of my empirical analysis, in section 2.4 the empirical specification and in
section 2.5 the data set. In section 2.6 I discuss the results of my empirical analysis, and in section 2.7 I set out
my conclusions.
2.2 Related literature
Several studies assess the imperfect substitutability of differently aged workers by analyzing cohort effects (e.g.,
Freeman, 1979; Welch, 1979; Berger, 1985; Sapozhnikov/Triest, 2007; Morin, 2015). Under the hypothesis that
workers of different age are imperfect substitutes, an increase in the relative size of an age group has a negative
effect on the wage rate of the members of that group. For Germany, the impact of cohort size on cohort specific
wages was recently analyzed by Garloff and Roth (2016). They estimate the effect of changes in the share
of the youth in total regional employment on the wages of youth workers within the regional labor market.
As expected, their findings indicate that wages of younger workers decrease if their share in total regional
employment increases.
Similarly, Card and Lemieux (2001) relate the raise in the cohort specific college wage premium to cohort
specific shifts in the relative supply of highly educated workers. They observe for the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Canada that the college wage premium for younger workers significantly increased relative to
the college wage premium for older workers. The empirical analysis indicates that this can be explained by
the observation that the age-group specific relative supply of college-educated labor grew faster in the group of
older workers than in the group of younger workers.
In their analysis Card and Lemieux (2001) employ a nested CES-framework. This strategy has been adopted by
several scholars. Recently, there are several studies focusing on the impact of immigration on wages of natives
(e.g., Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano/Peri, 2012; Haas et al., 2013). They apply a nested CES-framework and aim at
estimating the degree of complementarity between natives and immigrants within groups of workers that are
similar with respect to education and work experience.
Fitzenberger and Kohn (2006) use the CES-framework described by Card and Lemieux (2001) to analyze com-
plementarities between differently skilled workers for Germany. They estimate the parameters of a production
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function which refers to the national level using information on a random sample of employees based on the
IAB employment subsample (IABS). When analyzing complementarities between differently skilled workers,
Fitzenberger and Kohn (2006) take into account the imperfect substitutability of age groups, as they model the
amount of differently skilled labor as CES-subaggregates of the skill-specific employment quantities of individ-
uals in different age groups. Their findings confirm that differently aged employees are imperfect substitutes.
However, one drawback of the nested CES-framework applied by Card and Lemieux (2001), Fitzenberger and
Kohn (2006) and others is that it is based on “strong functional form assumptions” (Fitzenberger/Kohn, 2006:
24). By modelling skill-specific employment quantities as CES-subaggregates of different age groups, it is
assumed that the elasticity of substitution between any pair of differently aged workers is the same, i.e., the
degree of complementarity between younger and middle aged workers is the same as between younger and
older workers as well as between middle aged and older workers (Hamermesh/Grant, 1979; Ottaviano/Peri,
2012). Suppose, for example the abilities and the experience of a worker change monotonically with her age,
then this assumption likely is too restrictive.
As an alternative to a CES-function, a more flexible translog-function may be used to describe the imperfect
substitutability of differently aged workers in the production process. It allows the degree of complementarity
between age groups to vary. So far, there are only very few studies estimating age complementarities based
on translog-functions. Grant and Hamermesh (1981) distinguish between younger and different types of older
labor. Their findings for the United States indicate that the degree of complementarity between the different
groups of workers indeed differs. Similarly, Arntz and Gregory (2014) find that differently aged workers are
complements in the knowledge production process using regional data for Germany. However, this is only true
for younger and older workers. Younger and middle aged workers as well as middle aged and older workers
seem to be perfect substitutes.
One drawback of the studies by Grant and Hamermesh (1981) and Arntz and Gregory (2014) is that they
disregard the interaction of skill and age. As stressed by Fitzenberger and Kohn (2006) it is important to
analyze age complementarities within groups of workers that have a comparable skill level.
Taking this into account, I distinguish workers according to their skill level and approximate skill specific labor
input by a flexible translog-function rather than by a more restrictive CES-function allowing the degree of com-
plementarity to vary between age groups. In order to quantify the parameters that describe firms’ demand for
workers of different age, I estimate an establishment level cost function based on a linked employer-employee
data set. Estimating a cost function is based on the weaker assumption that firms minimize costs rather than
assuming profit maximization (Hamermesh/Grant, 1979).1
1 Hamermesh and Grant (1979) also note that one drawback of estimating a cost function is that it requires to invert the matrix of
estimated coefficients to obtain the elasticities of complementarity. A problem arises if one parameter has a very high standard error as
this reflects in the standard error of the computed elasticities. However, my analysis does not suffer from this.
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2.3 Theoretical framework
To identify complementarities between different age groups, I apply a nested production framework which is
in line with neoclassical production theory. This well established approach (see, e.g., Card/Lemieux, 2001;
Borjas, 2003; Fitzenberger/Kohn, 2006; Ottaviano/Peri, 2012; Haas et al., 2013) is based on the assumption
that the demand for different types of labor is separable from the demand for other inputs (Hamermesh, 1996).
As illustrated by figure 2.1, the top level describes the output of establishment f , Yf , as a function of technology
A f , intermediate products X f , capital κ f , and labor L f .
The labor aggregate L f is distinguished according to the qualification of the workers (index: q). On the next
level the skill specific labor input Lq f itself is partitioned into groups that differ according to the age of the
workers (index: i ∈ {y,m,o}): younger workers (y), middle aged workers (m), older workers (o). It is impor-
tant to note that Lq f is not the pure sum of, respectively, low, medium, and high skilled workers employed
by the establishment, but compound labor input, that also depends on complementarities between differently
aged workers with skill level q. This paper’s aim is to quantify the degree of complementarity between differ-
ently aged workers. Therefore, the empirical analysis focuses on the analysis of the third level of the nested
production framework, i.e., on the age composition of skill-specific labor inputs.
Y 
κ A 
X 
compound 
low skilled 
labor 
compound 
medium skilled 
labor 
compound 
high skilled 
labor 
y o m y o m y o m 
y: younger workers,   m: middle aged workers,   o: older workers 
L 
Figure 2.1: Nested production framework
Assuming establishment f choose Liq f , the amount of labor with age i and skill level q, such that the costs to
accumulate Lq f units of compound labor with skill level q at wage rate vector wq f are minimized, then, the total
costs of Lq f are given by Cq(wq f ,Lq f ). As suggested by Christensen et al. (1973) and others, ln(Cq(wq f ,Lq f ))
can be approximated by a function that is quadratic in the logarithms, see also Greene (2012):
ln(Cq(wq f ,Lq f )) = αq+∑
i
αiqviq f +
1
2∑i ∑j
βi jqviq f v jq f + lq f
with viq f := ln(wiq f ) and lq f := ln(Lq f ) (2.1)
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I assume that Cq(wq f ,Lq f ) is linear homogeneous in Lq f . This assumption implies that the cost minimizing,
relative composition of Lq f with respect to the different age groups is independent of the level of compound
labor input with skill level q. Its cost minimizing composition is given by (2.2) which is a system of share
equations that depend on the same parameters as (2.1).2 Siq f is the value share of age group i within skill group
q and establishment f and the parameters βi jq can be interpreted as share elasticities which indicate the skill
level specific response of i′s value share to an increase of j′s wage rate (Jorgenson, 1986).
Siq f (wq f )≡
L∗iq fwiq f
∑ j L∗jq fw jq f
= αiq+∑
j
βi jqv jq f , (2.2)
Estimates of (2.2) enable computation of the Hicks partial elasticities of complementarity, ci jq, and factor
price elasticities, θi jq (Hicks, 1970; Sato/Koizumi, 1973). In the context of my analysis, the elasticities provide
information on age complementarities by skill level. The derivation of the elasticities is given in appendix 2.B.3
In terms of a translog cost function ci jq is given by:
ci jq =
|Ki jq |
|K˜q|
, (2.3)
where |K˜q| is the determinant of matrix K˜q and |Ki jq | is the cofactor of Ki jq. Matrix K˜q is a transformation of
the bordered Hessian matrix4 of Cq(wq f ,Lq f ):
K˜q =

0 k1q . . . knq
k1q
... ki jq
knq

with
kiq = Siq,
ki jq = βi jq+SiqS jq , if i 6= j
kiiq = βiiq+SiqSiq−Siq. (2.4)
Based on ci jq the factor price elasticity is given by:
θi jq =
∂ ln(wiq)
∂ ln(L jq)
= S jqci jq. (2.5)
2 (2.2) has been derived by taking the partial derivative of (2.1) with respect to viq f and by applying Shephard’s Lemma. See appendix 2.A
for a detailed description.
3 As the elasticities depend on the cost shares, the elasticities vary across observations. I omit the index f in the description of the
elasticities for simplicity. In the empirical analysis the elasticities are computed at mean predicted shares.
4 For details see appendix 2.B. The bordered Hessian matrix and its derivation are given in appendix 2.C.
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If ci jq > 0(< 0) the age groups i and j within skill group q are called quantity complements (substitutes) since
an increase in L jq leads to an increase (decline) in wiq. θi jq measures the percentage change in wiq in response
to a one percent increase in L jq given wage rates are flexible (Sato/Koizumi, 1973).
2.4 Empirical specification and econometric issues
Since estimates of translog cost functions like (2.2) do not, per se, fulfill the properties of a microeconomic
cost function, parameter constraints have to be imposed. To maintain consistency with Young’s theorem of
integrable functions, symmetry constraints have to be fulfilled, i.e., βi jq = β jiq , i 6= j. In addition,Cq(wq f ,Lq f )
has to be monotone as well as linear homogeneous and concave in wiq (Jorgenson, 1986).
Monotonicity implies that the (predicted) cost shares have to be non-negative. However, since Cq(wq f ,Lq f )
is quadratic in the logarithms of the wage rates, it is not possible to impose parameter constrains that ensure
monotonicity (Jorgenson, 1986). Thus, whether this property is fulfilled has to be checked after the estimation.
The other two properties, linear homogeneity and concavity, however, can be imposed. Linear homogeneity
requires that the parameters αiq add up to unity and the parameters βi jq add up to zero:
∑
i
αiq = 1 , ∑
i
βi jq = 0. (2.6)
Concavity of Cq(wq f ,Lq f ) implies that its Hessian matrix Hq is negative semi-definite. Diewert and Wales
(1987) show that this is fulfilled provided thatC(wq f ,Lq f )> 0, if and only if the matrix Kq (as defined in (2.4))
is negative semi-definite.
However, since Hq and Kq depend on the data, i.e., on the cost shares Siq f , a different Hessian matrix and thus
a different matrix Kq is obtained for each observation. As shown by Diewert and Wales (1987), imposing con-
cavity globally destroys the flexibility of the translog function and may result in biased estimates as restrictions
on own and cross price elasticities are imposed. Therefore, Ryan and Wales (2000) suggest to impose concavity
locally at a normalization point. If the sample mean is chosen as normalization point, i.e., all wage rates are
centered around their respective mean, the logarithmic wage rates are zero at this point and Siq f equals αiq, see
(2.2), such that Hq and Kq in this point only depend on parameters.5 The i jth element of Kq is then given by:
ki jq = βi jq−αiqδi j+αiqα jq (2.7)
with δi j = 1 if i= j and 0 otherwise, compare (2.4). Hence, in this point parameter restrictions can be imposed.
5 Please note, centering the wage rates does not affect the parameter estimates, except the estimates of αiq.
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Concavity of the cost function in the neighborhood of the normalization point can be attained by setting
−Kq = DD′q (Ryan/Wales, 2000), where D is a lower triangular matrix.6 Solving (2.7) for βi jq and replac-
ing −ki jq by the i jth element of DD′q7 yields non linear constraints that impose concavity of Cq(wq f ,Lq f ) in
the neighborhood of the normalization point (Ryan/Wales, 2000: 255):
βi jq =−(DD′)i jq+αiqδi jq−αiqα jq. (2.8)
If the parameter constraint given by (2.8) as well as the symmetry constraint, i.e., βi jq = β jiq, are inserted into
the system of share equations given by (2.2) and random disturbances added, (2.2) changes to (2.9).8 Since the
parameters βi jq are replaced by (2.8), the parameters di jq are estimated instead of βi jq. It is worth noting that
the number of parameters di jq is equal to the number of parameters βi jq. The non-linear constraint given by
(2.8) ensures that the parameters βi jq are in a certain relationship to each other such that the Hessian matrix of
Cq(wq f ,Lq f ) is negative semi-definite, at least in the reference point.
Syq f = αyq+(−dyyqdyyq+αyq−αyqαyq)vyq f +(−dymqdyyq−αyqαmq)vmq f +(−dyyqdyoq−αyqαoq)voq f + εyq f
Smq f = αmq+(−dymqdyyq−αyqαmq)vyq f +(−dymqdymq−dmmqdmmq+αmq−αmqαmq)vmq f
+(−dyoqdymq−dmoqdmmq−αmqαoq)voq f + εmq f
Soq f = αoq+(−dyyqdyoq−αyqαoq)vyq f +(−dyoqdymq−dmoqdmmq−αmqαoq)vmq f
+(−dyoqdyoq−dmoqdmoq−dooqdooq+αoq−αoqαoq)voq f + εoq f . (2.9)
The indices y, m, and o refer to younger, middle aged, and older workers respectively, that belong to skill group
q within establishment f . εiq f are unobservable random disturbances for the cost shares.
Since the cost shares Syq f , Smq f , and Soq f sum up to unity for each observation q f , the sum of the error terms
∑i εiq f is equal to zero for all observations (Jorgenson, 1986). Hence, the error covariance matrix is singular.
Greene (2012) therefore suggests to estimate just n−1 share equations. Furthermore, he notes that computing
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters ensures invariance with respect to the choice of which share
equation is dropped.9
As stressed for example by Grant and Hamermesh (1981), one only derives unbiased estimates of a cost func-
tion, or a system of share equations that is based on factor prices, if the latter are exogenous to the firm.
Hamermesh (1996) therefore argues that the cost function would ideally be embedded in a system of equations
that also describes the labor supply reaction or workers’ choices. As an alternative, strictly exogenous variables
might be used to generate instruments for the factor prices in the cost function. However, to find such vari-
6 The idea of employing the Cholesky factorization to impose concavity goes back to Lau (1978).
7 Here: (DD′)q =
 d2yyq dyyqdmyq dyyqdoyqdyyqdmyq d2myq+d2mmq dmyqdoyq+dmmqdomq
dyyqdoyq dmyqdoyq+dmmqdomq d2oyq+d
2
omq+d
2
ooq
.
8 The adding-up constraints ∑iαiq= 1 and ∑i βi jq = 0 are directly imposed when estimating the system of equations.
9 I estimate (2.9) using Stata’s iterative feasible generalized least squares estimator which is equivalent to ML estimation with multivariate
normal disturbances and also invariant to the choice of the estimated share equations (see Stata’s manual nlsur - Estimation of nonlinear
systems of equations, page 9, http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rnlsur.pdf).
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ables is already a severe problem for studies that consider homogeneous labor. In the case of heterogeneous
labor it is “insolvable” (Hamermesh, 1996: 70). Therefore, one has to decide whether to treat quantities as
exogenous and to estimate a production function, or to treat wage rates as exogenous and to estimate a cost
function. Hamermesh (1996) argues that in the case of microeconomic data it is reasonable to assume the latter
since small units like establishments face perfect elastic labor supply in the long run. As a robustness check,
I exclude all establishments with 50 employees or more to address that large establishments may have local
monopsony power to set wages.
2.5 Data
To estimate the parameters of (2.9) that are needed to calculate ci j and θi j, I use detailed information on a
20 percent random sample of all establishments located in Germany that employed at least one worker subject
to social security contributions on June 30, 2012. The public sector, temporary employment agencies, and
crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities are excluded. The considered number of
establishments amounts to 508,514. For these establishments my raw data set contains all spells of employment
that were reported by the establishments in 2012, i.e., 9,124,309 individual employment spells. The information
on the spells of employment are taken from the IAB employment history (BeH).
The BeH is based on the integrated notification procedure for health, pension, and unemployment insurance.
Employers are required to submit notifications to the responsible social security agencies concerning all of
their employees covered by social security as well as marginally employed at least once a year. The Federal
Employment Agency collects and edits these notifications, which the IAB subsequently integrates into the BeH.
Thus, the BeH contains very reliable information on all spells of employment as long as the workers are not
exempt from social security contributions, like civil servants and self-employed persons (about 12 percent of
total employment in Germany).
Among other things, each observation in the BeH provides information on individual and job characteristics as
well as on the length of the specific spell of employment and the paid gross wage sum during this time period.
Due to the social security threshold, the wage information is right-censored and in 2012 only reported up to
e 67,200 per year in West Germany and e 57,600 per year in East Germany. To avoid biased estimates, I partly
impute the wages of employees subject to social security contributions with estimated wages.10
Aggregating the information provided by the 9 million individual spells of employment from the BeH, a unique
establishment level data set is generated.11 The units of observation are skill groups within the considered
establishments. As I am interested in composition effects of the skill groups at the establishment level with
regard to the age of the workers, I exclude very small skill groups, which I define as groups with less than five
10 I follow Reichelt (2015) and apply an interval regression to estimate the (daily) wages above the thresholds, see appendix 2.D.
11 Six percent of the employment spells are not considered. I exclude apprentices from the analysis. Furthermore, employment spells of
interns, and student trainees are only considered as long as the employees have at least a bachelors degree and have an occupation that
requires a vocational training of at least two years or higher education.
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members, i.e., ∑iLiq f < 5. The final number of observations that are used in the empirical analysis amounts to
290,334 skill groups within 208,868 establishments.12
To distinguish the employees of an establishment according to their skill level, i.e., low skilled, medium skilled,
and high skilled, the requirement level of the individual job is used.13 I define workers with an occupation that
does not require a vocational training of at least two years as low skilled. Medium skilled workers are those
with an occupation that requires a vocational training of at least two years, and workers with an occupation
that requires at least a bachelor’s degree, a qualification as master craftsman or technician, or an equivalent
technical school or college graduation are considered as high skilled.
I use the requirement level of the job instead of the highest educational degree of a worker which is also provided
in the BeH in order to identify low skilled, medium skilled, and high skilled labor for to two reasons. First, the
requirement level enables assignment of workers to the different skill groups according to the complexity of
their actual task and not according to their formal level of qualification. Haas et al. (2013) show that workers
with the same formal educational degree, but with different job requirements, are imperfect substitutes. Second,
27 percent of the nine million spells of employment do not provide information on the educational degree of
the worker, whereas the information on the requirement level is missing only in two percent of the employment
spells.14
For each skill group within an establishment, I compute its individual composition with regard to the age of the
workers. To be more specific, I compute the establishment-specific cost share of age group i within skill group
q and establishment f , Siq f . Unfortunately, the BeH does not provide information on non-wage labor costs.
Therefore, the computed cost shares refer to wage costs only. Summary statistics are provided by table 2.1. In
addition to the cost shares, the wages of the different age-skill groups, wiq f , that enter (2.9) on the right hand
side are calculated. wiq f indicates how much establishment f paid in 2012 on average per day to an employee
with age i and skill level q. For the calculation of wiq f only spells employment are used that refer to full-
time employment as more detailed information on working hours is not available. Moreover, when calculating
wiq f only spells of employment with a length of at least eight days and a gross-daily wage above the limit
of marginally employed are considered. In 40 percent of the cases it is not possible to calculate wiq f since
establishment f does not employ workers with age i and skill level q whose spells of employment fulfill the
criteria above. In these cases wiqr( f ) is used as an approximation of wiq f , where wiqr( f ) is the average gross
daily wage of group iq in region r( f ), i.e., the local labor market as defined by Kosfeld and Werner (2012) in
which establishment f is located. wiqr( f ) is calculated based on information from the Employment Statistics of
the Federal Employment Agency. It can be interpreted as the daily wage that establishment f would have to
pay to employ one unit of type iq labor in the local labor market where it is located.
12 Without excluding skill groups with less than five members, the number of observations would be 885,377.
13 The requirement level of a job is the second dimension of the German Classification of Occupations 2010 (KldB 2010). A detailed
description can be found in Paulus and Matthes (2013).
14 If the requirement level is missing but the highest educational degree is not, then the later is used to assign the workers to one of the
skill groups. This reduces the share of employment spells that cannot be assigned to one of the three groups to 0.07%. In 65.8% of
the cases in which information on the requirement level as well as on the highest educational degree is available the requirement level
accords with the reported highest educational degree. In 16.6% the reported highest educational degree is higher and in 17.6% lower
than the requirement level.
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The age group to which an employee belongs is defined by his or her day of birth that is also given in the
BeH. In accordance with Mahlberg et al. (2013), employees younger than 30 years are considered as younger
workers, workers aged 30 to 49 years as middle aged workers and workers that are 50 years old or older as
older workers.15
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Groups of low skilled labor (N = 64405)
Cost shares
Younger labor 0.215 0.244 0.000 1.000
Middle aged labor 0.459 0.259 0.000 1.000
Older labor 0.326 0.266 0.000 1.000
ln(Average gross daily wages)
Younger labor 3.976 0.227 2.558 5.621
Middle aged labor 4.155 0.295 2.565 6.268
Older labor 4.229 0.273 2.570 6.127
Groups of medium skilled labor (N = 173313)
Cost shares
Younger labor 0.205 0.213 0.000 1.000
Middle aged labor 0.501 0.232 0.000 1.000
Older labor 0.294 0.238 0.000 1.000
ln(Average gross daily wages)
Younger labor 4.203 0.273 2.560 6.710
Middle aged labor 4.336 0.365 2.558 6.214
Older labor 4.424 0.351 2.559 6.460
Groups of high skilled labor (N = 52617)
Cost shares
Younger labor 0.121 0.178 0.000 1.000
Middle aged labor 0.561 0.237 0.000 1.000
Older labor 0.318 0.252 0.000 1.000
ln(Average gross daily wages)
Younger labor 4.506 0.286 2.570 6.368
Middle aged labor 4.823 0.417 2.568 7.441
Older labor 4.960 0.408 2.567 6.959
2.6 Results
I start with a regression where I pool the observations that belong to different skill groups. Thus, by now I
assume that the parameters and elasticities do not differ across skill levels. The first and the second column of
table 2.2 contain the estimated parameters of (2.9), i.e., the system of share equations including the parameter
constraints ensuring that the cost function is concave. As the adding-up constraints, see (2.6), are imposed when
estimating the model, not all parameters are explicitly reported.16 Inserting the reported parameters into (2.8)
15 0.4 percent of the nine million spells of employment are not assigned to one of the age groups since the worker is implausible old
(above 75 years).
16 Please note, the adding-up constraints given by (2.6) require that ∑i βi j is zero. The corresponding constraints with regard to di j are
obtained by combining the adding-up constraints with the constraints that are imposed to ensure that the cost function is concave which
is given by (2.8).
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and (2.6), i.e., the concavity and the adding-up constraints, the parameters βi j are obtained. They are reported
in the third column of table 2.2. Based on these parameters, the Hicks partial elasticities of complementarity,
ci j, and factor price elasticities, θi j and θ ji, are calculated using (2.3) and (2.5), respectively. As θi j depends on
the cost share of age group j and θ ji on the cost share of age group i, θi j is not symmetric, i.e., θi j = θ ji only
holds if Siq = S jq.
Table 2.2: Estimated parameters and calculated elasticities,
average effects assuming αiq = αi, βi jq = βi j
i j αi di j βi j ci j θi j θ ji
y y 0.194*** 0.455*** -0.050*** -3.273*** -0.628*** -0.628***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.022) (0.004) (0.004)
m m 0.503*** 0.528*** -0.066*** -0.801*** -0.403*** -0.403***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
o o -0.137*** -1.394*** -0.426*** -0.426***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
y m -0.192*** -0.010*** 0.999*** 0.502*** 0.192***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002)
y o 0.061*** 0.413*** 0.126*** 0.079***
(0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
m o 0.076*** 0.690*** 0.211*** 0.347***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
N 290335
Standard errors in parentheses, calculation based on Delta-method, significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The data is
normalized at the sample mean. Monotonicity and concavity of the cost function are satisfied at all data points. The concavity constraint
is locally imposed at the sample mean. The elasticities are calculated at mean predicted shares.
Since I center the wage rate of each age-skill group around their mean, the results for αi indicate that, at the
reference point where the wage rates correspond to their respective mean, the cost share of younger workers
amounts to about 20 percent, the cost share of middle aged workers to about 50 percent, and, hence, the cost
share of older workers to about 30 percent. Furthermore, the results in column three indicate that the cost share
of each age group declines, given an increase in the wage rate of the respective age group. This shows that
firms react on increasing relative wages by substituting one age group by another. However, there is also a
negative relationship between the cost share of younger workers and the wage rate of middle aged workers (and
vice versa due to the symmetry constraint). This negative cross effect points to the imperfect substitutability of
younger and middle aged workers. However, positive cross price elasticities, per se, do not necessarily imply
that those groups of workers are perfect substitutes.17
The results in column four to six indicate how the productivity of age groups change in response to changes in
the amount of age specific labor input. As expected, the marginal productivity of an age group declines if its
size increases. The effect is largest for younger workers which is in line with findings by Welch (1979). He
observes that the negative effect of cohort size on wages of the same cohort declines over the career.
17 It follows from the adding-up constraint given by (2.6) that the parameters βym as well as βmo need to be positive if βym and βii are
negative.
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The cross effects indicate that all three age groups are complementary input factors, i.e., all age groups benefit
from working together with differently aged workers. But the degree of complementarity differs. This points
out that flexible functional forms, like a translog function, are needed to quantify the degree of complementarity
between different age groups. A CES framework, for example, is too restrictive as the elasticities of substitution
between any two pairs of age groups are assumed to be the same.
My results show that the highest degree of complementarity is observed for younger and middle aged workers,
the lowest for younger and older workers. With regard to younger workers this indicates that they especially
benefit of working together with middle aged workers. One reasonable explanation is that younger workers
benefit from the working experience of middle aged workers. At the same time it might be beneficial that the
knowledge base and the abilities of younger and middle aged workers are not too different which might enhance
cooperation. An alternative interpretation of the cross effects is that it is more difficult to substitute middle aged
workers by either younger or older workers, than younger by older workers (and vice versa) as middle aged
workers have a combination of cognitive abilities of younger workers and experience of older workers. This
combination make them especially valuable, what in turn decreases substitutability.
I use the calculated own and cross factor price elasticities, θi j, to simulate how the demographic change might
affect the productivity of the three age groups due to the expected shift in relative labor supply (compare Grant/-
Hamermesh, 1981). It is assumed that the shift in relative labor supply reflects in a corresponding shift in the
age structure of (skill-specific) employment. Furthermore, the model calculation is based on the assumption that
the productivity of compound skill-specific labor in terms of the value of its marginal product, P ∂Y∂L
∂L
∂Lq where P
denotes the price of one unit of output Y , remains constant for all three skill groups.18 In the model calculation,
I examine a scenario where the number of younger workers decreases by 21 percent, and the number of middle
aged workers by 16.5 percent. The number of older workers is assumed to increase by 3.9 percent.19
The results of the model calculation are summarized in table 2.3. They suggest that the productivity of younger
workers will increase most (by five percent) due to the assumed changes in the age structure of the workforce.
The own factor price elasticity of younger workers (θyy) would predict an productivity increase of the wage
rate by more than 13 percent in response to the assumed decline of younger labor by 21 percent. Further
upward pressure on the wage of younger workers comes from the increasing number of older workers as it
lets the relative amount of young workers decline. In contrast, the decreasing number of middle aged workers
puts downward pressure on the wages of younger workers due to the complementary relationship. In total, the
productivity of younger workers is therefore expected to rise ‘only’ by about five percent.
Similarly, the decline in the number of middle aged workers and the increase in the number of older workers
let the productivity of middle aged workers increase. The decreasing number of younger workers, however,
puts downward pressure on the wage of middle aged workers. The total effect is expected to be a productivity
18 This assumption implies that the marginal costs of compound skill-specific labor are assumed to remain unchanged since at the cost
minimum the marginal value product equals marginal costs (compare appendix 2.B: for the model calculation dφ is assumed to be
zero).
19 This scenario is based on the relative change of the population aged 15-29 years, 30-49 years, and 50-70 years that is expected by the
German Federal Statistical Office until 2030 (DESTATIS, 2009). Changes in labor participation rates are not considered.
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increase of about three percent. For older workers the model calculation predicts a strong decrease in produc-
tivity, i.e., a decline by nine percent. Predominantly this is caused by the decreasing number of younger and
middle aged workers, wherefore the relative amount of older workers increases. The ceteris paribus effect of
the increasing number of older workers suggests a reduction in productivity by less than two percent.
Table 2.3: Results of a model calculation
Expected percentage change in
productivity of . . .
younger middle aged older
workers workers workers
5.4 3.4 -9.0
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
Effects based on factor price elasticities (θi j,θ ji in table 2.2) and the scenario: number of younger workers -21%, middle aged workers
-16.5%, older workers: +3.9%. Standard errors in parentheses, calculation based on Delta-method.
By relaxing the assumption that the elasticities do not vary across skill levels, heterogeneous effects across
skill levels become visible, see table 2.4. Own price elasticities are highest in absolute terms within groups
of high-skilled labor, especially for younger high-skilled labor. It indicates that a relatively small decline in
the number of younger high-skilled workers leads to a relatively large productivity increase of the remaining
younger workers.
The cross effects are heterogeneous across skill groups as well. The degree of complementarity between
younger and middle aged workers is highest within groups of high-skilled labor. The same result is obtained
for the degree of complementarity between middle aged and older workers. This supports the findings of Welch
(1979) who observes that the degree of complementarity between cohorts increases by skill level.
Surprisingly and in contrast to the expectation that especially within groups of high skilled labor cognitive
abilities of younger workers and experience of older workers complement each other, I find that the degree
of complementarity between younger and older workers decreases in the skill level. The presence of younger
workers seems to have a higher importance for the productivity of older workers (and vice versa) in groups of
low skilled workers than in other skill groups. One reasonable explanation for the high degree of complemen-
tarity between younger and older workers with jobs that require only little specific training is that some of their
tasks are often connected with physical burden. Hence, older low skilled workers might benefit from working
together with younger workers as tasks could be shared according to the individual physical capacity. In ad-
dition, especially within groups of low skilled workers with tasks that do not require specific training, general
labor market experience might still enhance productivity. Therefore, younger low skilled workers might benefit
from older low skilled workers who presumably have at least some general working experience.
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Table 2.4: Elasticities by skill level
low skilled labor medium skilled labor high skilled labor
i j ci j θi j θ ji ci j θi j θ ji ci j θi j θ ji
y y -2.936*** -0.630*** -0.630*** -2.257*** -0.463*** -0.463*** -7.870*** -0.954*** -0.954***
(0.053) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.183) (0.022) (0.022)
m m -0.818*** -0.376*** -0.376*** -0.707*** -0.354*** -0.354*** -1.042*** -0.585*** -0.585***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010)
o o -1.242*** -0.405*** -0.405*** -1.324*** -0.390*** -0.390*** -1.847*** -0.587*** -0.587***
(0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.007) (0.007)
y m 0.890*** 0.409*** 0.191*** 0.768*** 0.385*** 0.157*** 1.892*** 1.061*** 0.229***
(0.019) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.053) (0.030) (0.006)
y o 0.678*** 0.221*** 0.146*** 0.265*** 0.078*** 0.054*** -0.337*** -0.107*** -0.041***
(0.022) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.043) (0.014) (0.005)
m o 0.566*** 0.185*** 0.260*** 0.669*** 0.197*** 0.335*** 1.119*** 0.355*** 0.628***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.018) (0.006) (0.010)
N 64405 173313 52617
Standard errors in parentheses, calculation based on Delta-method, significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The data is normalized at the respective sample mean.
Monotonicity and concavity of the cost function are satisfied at more than 99 percent of the respective data points. The concavity constraint is locally imposed at the respective
sample mean. The elasticities are calculated at mean predicted shares.
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The high degree of substitutability between younger and older high-skilled labor supports the view of Fitzen-
berger and Kohn (2006). They argue that university graduates have in general (independent of their age) high
competence to solve problems which reduces complementarities. Nevertheless, it remains surprising that,
within groups of high skilled labor, younger and older workers are rather substitutes than complements, but
younger and middle aged workers as well as middle aged and older workers complement each other. But the
finding is robust.
As stressed earlier, my estimates can only be interpreted as causal effects if wage rates are exogenous to the
firms. As a robustness check, I repeat the estimations with a reduced sample that only covers rather small
establishments, defined as establishments with less than 50 employees. The additional results are summarized
in table 2.E.1 and table 2.E.2 in appendix 2.E. Qualitatively the results are similar to those discussed in this
section. Quantitatively, the parameter estimates and calculated elasticities that are based on the reduced sample
are ten percent to 20 percent smaller than those that are based on the full sample. As a further robustness check,
I restrict my sample to skill groups with, on the establishment level, at least ten members. Again I observe
qualitatively similar results, even though the number of observations reduces significantly.20
2.7 Conclusion
In this study, I analyze complementarities between differently aged workers. This is of special interest since
demographic change leads to a shift in the workforce age structure in Germany as well as in many other
European countries which likely affects (relative) productivity of workers. Taking into account the interaction
of skill and age, I analyze age complementarities within groups of workers with a comparable skill level.
Contrary to previous papers, my analysis is based on a linked employer-employee data set. This allows the
investigation of age complementarities on establishment level, i.e., directly at the workplace. Studies operating
at the aggregate level might suffer from ecological fallacy because their results are interpreted as if they pertain
to behavior of firms. Moreover, in contrast to most other studies, I provide empirical evidence on the way the
degree of complementarity varies between age groups. Often it is assumed that the substitutability of different
age groups is constant, meaning that it does not depend on the age groups that are considered. My findings
suggest that this assumption does not hold.
The results of this study indicate that workers who belong to different age groups are complements and that
the degree of complementarity differs across the considered age groups and by skill level. Even though, for
each skill level the largest degree of complementarity is identified between younger and middle aged workers
which especially applies to the group of high-skilled labor. In contrast, younger and older high-skilled workers
seem to be substitutes rather than complements. This surprises, as Arntz and Gregory (2014) find that cognitive
abilities of younger workers and experience of older workers complement each other in generating innovations,
which typically involves high-skilled labor.
20 The additional results are available from the author upon request.
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Based on my results, I simulate how the expected demographic change impacts on the productivity of the
different age groups. Due to the complementary relationship between older workers and the two other groups,
the expected decline in younger and middle aged workers puts pressure on the wages of older workers. Under
the assumption that wages are completely flexible and that the overall productivity of compound labor remains
constant, one could for this age group expect a decline in wages of about nine percent until 2030. On the
contrary, my results show that the wage of younger and middle aged workers is expected to rise by about five
percent and three percent, respectively, since their relative shares decline.
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Appendix
2.A Deriving the system of share equations
The partial derivative of ln(Cq(wq f ,Lq f )), as given by (2.1), with respect to ln(wiq f ) corresponds to
∂ ln(Cq(wq f ,Lq f ))
∂ ln(wiq f )
= αiq+∑
j
βi jq ln(w jq f ). (2.10)
∂ ln(Cq(wq f ,Lq f ))
∂ ln(wiq f ) is the elasticity of Cq(wq f ,Lq f ) with regard to wiq f . Thus:
∂ ln(Cq(wq f ,Lq f ))
∂ ln(wiq f )
=
dCq(wq f ,Lq f )
Cq(wq f ,Lq f )
dwiq f
wiq f
=
dCq(wq f ,Lq f )
dwiq f
wiq f
Cq(wq f ,Lq f )
. (2.11)
According to Shephard’s Lemma, see appendix 2.C: dCq(wq f ,Lq f )dwiq f = L
∗
iq f , where L
∗
iq f is the cost minimizing
number of type iq workers given the price vector wq f and Lq f . Hence, the cost minimizing share Siq f of type iq
workers in type q workers amounts to:
Siq f (wq f ) =
L∗iq fwiq
∑ j L∗jq fw jq f
= αiq+∑
j
βi jq ln(w jq f ). (2.12)
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2.B Deriving the Hicks partial elasticity of complementarity and the factor price elasticity
The derivation of the Hicks partial elasticity of complementarity and of factor price elasticity are provided by,
e.g., Sato and Koizumi (1973). As the elasticities are of central importance for my empirical analysis, I sketch
it here in more detail. For simplicity, I omit the indices q and f .
Sato and Koizumi (1973) start with Shephard’s Lemma. Accordingly, the partial derivative of a cost function
with respect to factor price of input i corresponds to the conditional factor demand of i:
∂C(w,L)
∂wi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ci
= Li(w,L). (2.13)
Assuming the cost function is linear homogeneous in L, the corresponding total differential is given by, compare
appendix 2.C:
Ci
dL
L
+∑
j
Ci jdw j = dLi. (2.14)
This equation can be transferred into a system of total differentials and expressed in matrix form:
0 C1 . . . Cn
C1 C11 . . . C1n
...
...
. . .
...
Cn Cn1 . . . Cnn

︸ ︷︷ ︸
H˜

dL
L
dw1
...
dwn

︸ ︷︷ ︸
dw
=

Ldφ
dL1
...
dLn

︸ ︷︷ ︸
dL
where H˜ denotes the bordered Hessian matrix of the cost function, see appendix 2.C The first row refers to
the change of minimum total costs due to changes in factor prices. φ denotes the Lagrange multiplier of cost
minimization which in equilibrium equals marginal costs (Sato/Koizumi, 1973).
It follows that dw = H˜−1dL. Hence, the partial derivative of wi with respect to L j is given by:
∂wi
∂L j
= (H˜−1)ij ≡ |H
i j|
|H˜| , (2.15)
where |Hi j| denotes the cofactor of Ci j and |H˜| the determinant of H˜.
Therefore, the factor price elasticity is given by
∂ ln(wi)
∂ ln(L j)
=
∂wi
∂L j
L j
wi
=
|Hi j|
|H˜|
L j
wi
. (2.16)
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By multiplying the right hand side by w jCw jC , the factor price elasticity can be expressed as a function of j’s cost
share, S j, and the Hicks partial elasticity of complementarity, ci j:
∂ ln(wi)
∂ ln(L j)
=
L jw j
C︸ ︷︷ ︸
S j
C
wiw j
|Hi j|
|H˜|︸ ︷︷ ︸
ci j
. (2.17)
As I consider a translog specification of a cost function, the Hicks partial elasticity of complementarity simpli-
fies to:
ci j =
|Ki j|
|K˜| , (2.18)
where K˜ is a transformation of H˜:
K˜ =

0 K1 . . . Kn
K1 K11 . . . K1n
...
...
. . .
...
Kn Kn1 . . . Knn

with, compare appendix 2.C,
Ki = Ci
wi
C(w,L)
= Si (2.19)
Kii = Cii
w2i
C(w,L)
= S2i −Si+βii (2.20)
Ki j = Ci j
wiw j
C(w,L)
= SiS j+βi j. (2.21)
That in the case of a translog cost function it holds
|Ki j|
|K˜| =
C
wiw j
|Hi j|
|H˜| , (2.22)
can be seen if K˜ is expressed in matrix notation:
K˜ =
ŴH˜Ŵ
C(w,L)
,
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where Ŵ is a diagonal matrix:
Ŵ≡

1 0 . . . 0
0 w1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . wn
 .
Hence:
K˜−1 =C(w,L)Ŵ−1H˜−1Ŵ−1 (2.23)
and
|Ki j|
|K˜| ≡ (K
−1)i j =C(w,L)
1
wi
(H−1)i j
1
w j
≡ C
wiw j
|Hi j|
|H˜| . (2.24)
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2.C Deriving the bordered Hessian matrix H˜ of the cost function C(w,L)
In the following, I derive the (bordered) Hessian matrix of the translog cost function given by equation (2.1).
For simplicity, I omit the indices q and f . The result can also be found in, e.g., Hamermesh and Grant (538ff.
1979).
H˜ =

0 C1 . . . Cn
C1
... H
Cn

H =

C11 . . . C1n
...
. . .
...
Cn1 . . . Cnn

C(w,L) = exp
[
a0+∑
i
αi ln(wi)+
1
2∑i ∑j
βi j ln(wi) ln(w j)+ l
]
Ci =
∂C(w,L)
∂wi
= C(w,L)
(
αi
1
wi
+∑
j
βi j
1
wi
ln(w j)
)
, with βi j = β ji
=
C(w,L)
wi
[
αi+∑
j
βi j ln(w j)
]
=
C(w,L)
wi
Si (= L∗i , Shephard’s Lemma) (2.25)
Cii =
∂ 2C(w,L)
∂wiwi
= C(w,L)
(
αi
1
wi
+∑
j
βi j
1
wi
ln(w j)
)(
αi
1
wi
+∑
j
βi j
1
wi
ln(w j)
)
+C(w,L)
(
−αi 1wi
1
wi
+
(
−∑
j
βi j
1
wi
1
wi
ln(w j)+βii
1
wi
1
wi
))
= C(w,L)
[
1
wi
(
αi+∑
j
βi j ln(w j)
)
1
wi
(
αi+∑
j
βi j ln(w j)
)
+
1
w2i
(
−αi−∑
j
βi j ln(w j)+βii
)]
=
C(w,L)
w2i
[
S2i −Si+βii
]
(2.26)
Ci j =
∂ 2C(w,L)
∂wiw j
= C(w,L)
(
αi
1
wi
+∑
j
βi j
1
wi
ln(w j)
)(
α j
1
w j
+∑
i
βi j
1
w j
ln(wi)
)
+C(w,L)βi j
1
wiw j
, i 6= j
= C(w,L)
1
wi
(
αi+∑
j
βi j ln(w j)
)
1
w j
(
α j+∑
i
βi j ln(wi)
)
+C(w,L)βi j
1
wiw j
=
C(w,L)
wiw j
[(
αi+∑
j
βi j ln(w j)
)(
α j+∑
i
βi j ln(wi)
)
+βi j
]
=
C(w,L)
wiw j
[SiS j+βi j] (2.27)
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2.D Imputation of censored wages
Since the wages in the BeH are only reported up to the social security threshold (2012: e 67,200 per year
in West Germany, e 57,600 in East Germany), I have to estimate those wages which are above the censoring
limit. I use additional information from the BeH, i.e., the age, sex, and nationality of the workers as well as
requirement level of the job, the employment status, the establishment size, the industry (2-digit level), the
occupation (3-digit level), and the type of region the employees are working in.
Following Reichelt (2015), I apply interval regression to estimate the wages above the threshold and add an
error term to the estimates, i.e., a random value from a normal distribution. As the wage information is right
censored, the interval regression is equivalent to tobit regression. Since the estimated wage has to be larger
than the censoring limit, the random variable is drawn from a truncated distribution as suggested by Gartner
(2005). Wages of certain groups like marginal employed, interns, and student trainees should not be affected
by the social security threshold. They are therefore excluded from the interval regression, whose results are
summarized in table 2.D.1. Figure 2.D.1 shows the wage distribution before and after imputation.
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Figure 2.D.1: Wage distribution before (left figure) and after (right figure) imputation
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Table 2.D.1: Results of an interval regression to partly impute
the censored wages of employees liable to social security
Dependent variable: ln(Censored gross daily wage)
Age 0.040∗∗∗ (311.32)
Age2 -0.000∗∗∗ (-254.03)
Female -0.189∗∗∗ (-345.38)
German 0.074∗∗∗ (96.50)
Requirement level according to KldB 2010 (see Paulus/Matthes, 2013),
reference: Unskilled or semi-skilled activities
Specialist activities 0.204∗∗∗ (283.20)
Complex specialist activities 0.408∗∗∗ (409.92)
Highly complex activities 0.609∗∗∗ (553.25)
Parttime -0.527∗∗∗ (-967.73)
Employment status, reference: Employees liable to social security
without special characteristics
Employees in partial retirement 0.118∗∗∗ (73.02)
Causal worker 0.466∗∗∗ (94.22)
Employed pensioner (subject to social security contributions) -0.349∗∗∗ (-104.63)
Seaman 0.313∗∗∗ (28.86)
Seaman in partial retirement 0.706∗∗∗ (12.59)
Establishment size: ln(Number of employees) 0.076∗∗∗ (609.69)
Type of region, reference: Agglomerations in West Germany
Urbanized region in West Germany -0.038∗∗∗ (-75.40)
Rural region in West Germany -0.049∗∗∗ (-60.32)
Agglomeration in East Germany -0.127∗∗∗ (-166.33)
Urbanized region in East Germany -0.211∗∗∗ (-240.32)
Rural region in East Germany -0.227∗∗∗ (-202.68)
Constant 2.423∗∗∗ (74.32)
Total number of observations 6,173,784
Censored observations 525,152
Uncensored observations 5,648,632
Log-likelihood full model -4.523e+06
Log-likelihood intercept only -6.870e+06
t-statistics in parentheses, significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Beside the explanatory variables reported in this table
industry fixed effects (2-digit level: 82 industries) and occupation fixed effects (3-digit level: 144 occupations) are considered. Marginal
employed, interns, and student trainees are not considered as their wage should not be affected by the social security threshold.
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2.E Further results
Table 2.E.1: Results based on a reduced sample: only establishments
with less than 50 employees, average effect assuming αiq = αi, βi jq = βi j
i j αi di j βi j ci j θi j θ ji
y y 0.205*** 0.505*** -0.092*** -2.599*** -0.524*** -0.524***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.042) (0.016) (0.003)
m m 0.502*** 0.543*** -0.093*** -0.730*** -0.367*** -0.367***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
o o -0.169*** -1.339*** -0.396*** -0.396***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
y m -0.220*** 0.008*** 0.854*** 0.429*** 0.172***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008) (0.001)
y o 0.084*** 0.322*** 0.095*** 0.065***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
m o 0.085*** 0.658*** 0.194*** 0.331***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
N 226290
Standard errors in parentheses, calculation based on Delta-method, significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The data is
normalized at the sample mean. Monotonicity and concavity of the cost function are satisfied at all data points. The concavity constraint
is locally imposed at the sample mean. The elasticities are calculated at mean predicted shares.
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Table 2.E.2: Elasticities by skill level based on reduced sample: only establishments with less than 50 employees
low skilled labor medium skilled labor high skilled labor
i j ci j θi j θ ji ci j θi j θ ji ci j θi j θ ji
y y -2.320*** -0.524*** -0.524*** -2.081*** -0.434*** -0.434*** -5.203*** -0.730*** -0.730***
(0.044) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.113) (0.016) (0.016)
m m -0.706*** -0.329*** -0.329*** -0.679*** -0.340*** -0.340*** -0.869*** -0.488*** -0.488***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
o o -1.151*** -0.356*** -0.356*** -1.298*** -0.377*** -0.377*** -1.711*** -0.509*** -0.509***
(0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.006) (0.006)
y m 0.767*** 0.357*** 0.173*** 0.723*** 0.362*** 0.151*** 1.427*** 0.802*** 0.200***
(0.017) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.038) (0.021) (0.005)
y o 0.540*** 0.167*** 0.122*** 0.248*** 0.071*** 0.052*** -0.243*** -0.072*** -0.034***
(0.019) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.034) (0.010) (0.005)
m o 0.502*** 0.155*** 0.234*** 0.651*** 0.189*** 0.326*** 0.967*** 0.288*** 0.543***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.016) (0.005) (0.009)
N 45302 147292 33696
Standard errors in parentheses, calculation based on Delta-method, significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The data is normalized at the respective sample mean.
Monotonicity and concavity of the cost function are satisfied at more than 99 percent of the respective data points. The concavity constraint is locally imposed at the respective
sample mean. The elasticities are calculated at mean predicted shares.
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Quantifying the effect of labor market size on
learning externalities
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3.1 Introduction
There is extensive empirical evidence that wages in large local labor markets are significantly higher than
wages in smaller ones. Figure 3.1 illustrates disparities in regional wages for Germany. The difference in the
regional wage level of the largest labor market region and the smallest amounts to more than 40 percent. Similar
significant disparities are observed for other countries; see, e.g., Glaeser and Maré (2001) for the United States
and Combes et al. (2008) for France. This raises the question, why firms in agglomerations1 pay high wages
and do not relocate to regions in which labor is cheaper.2
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Raw elasticities: West Germany = 0.087, East Germany = 0.064.
Figure 3.1: Local labor market size and regional wages.
Note: The figure refers to average regional wages that are paid at the beginning of new employment relationships starting in 2011 and
the size of regional labor markets in terms of number of employees subject to social security contributions.
Glaeser and Maré (2001: 317) note, “The best explanation [. . . ] is that these higher wages are compensated for
by higher productivity.” They distinguish three possible reasons as to why workers might be more productive
in urban than in non-urban labor markets. Most of the underlying theoretical arguments were already discussed
in the 19th century by List (1838), Roscher (1878), and Marshall (1890). Nevertheless, it is still an ongoing
issue as understanding the mechanisms behind this phenomenon refers to the fundamental question of urban
economics about why cities exist (Glaeser/Maré, 2001).
1 I use terms like ’agglomeration’, ’city’, ’urban region’, ’large local labor market’ interchangeably to improve readability.
2 Explanations why workers do not fully concentrate in cities where wages are higher refer to higher costs of living and urban disamenities
(Glaeser/Maré, 2001).
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The first explanation refers to the sorting of more able workers into cities, arguing that higher wages in cities
reflect higher abilities of its workers. Regarding the importance of sorting, there still is an ongoing debate.
While Combes et al. (2008) conclude ‘sorting matters’, De la Roca and Puga (2016) find that it is less important
once dynamic agglomeration economies (see below) are considered. D’Costa and Overman (2014) in turn argue
that sorting plays a role in explaining why wages in agglomerations grow faster.
The second explanation is static agglomeration benefits based on sharing, matching, and learning. Duranton
and Puga (2004) discuss the different mechanisms in detail. Sharing refers to, among other things, benefits of
sharing gains from variety and individual specialization. Matching advantages arise if the chances of matching
and the quality of successful matches between job seekers and vacancies increase with the size of the local
labor market. An example of learning effects that result in a static agglomeration benefit is where firms learn
more from other firms that are located nearby and thereby improve their own production process. Static ag-
glomeration benefits are supposed to generate an immediate wage increase if workers move from a non-urban
to an urban environment, whereas leaving a city leads to an immediate wage decline (Glaeser/Maré, 2001).
There is ample evidence that static agglomeration benefits exist. Recent studies find that doubling employment
density leads to a wage increase by about one to two percent (e.g., Combes et al., 2008; De la Roca/Puga, 2016).
Combes and Gobillon (2015) provide a comprehensive overview.
The third explanation is dynamic agglomeration benefits, which are the main interest of this paper. They
are supposed to enhance individual wage growth in cities. There are primarily two mechanisms discussed in
this context which were already mentioned by List (1838). He recognized, inter alia, that concentration of
economic activity enhances the individual opportunities for workers to acquire new skills and that accessibility
helps to find new jobs. In the recent discussion, the mechanisms are labeled learning and coordination, also
referred to as dynamic matching. Similar to List’s considerations, the coordination hypothesis suggests that
urban density makes it “easier for workers to find the best jobs for themselves” (Glaeser/Maré, 2001: 322).
The learning hypothesis proposes that workers accumulate more human capital by working in an agglomerated
urban environment than by working elsewhere and that these workers can make use of this knowledge even if
they migrate to another labor market. The objective of this paper is to analyze the importance of this channel.
If working in a large labor market fosters individual accumulation of knowledge and thereby increases the
human capital endowment of a worker, the marginal value of work experience should be higher, the larger
the labor markets have been in which experience was acquired. Pioneered by the work of De la Roca and
Puga (2016), recent findings support this hypothesis (see also Andersson et al., 2014; D’Costa/Overman, 2014;
Matano/Naticchioni, 2016). These studies show that the value of work experience which was acquired in
the largest cities of a country has a significant higher value than experience acquired elsewhere and that this
manifests in higher wages. It raises the question of how the value of experience exactly depends on the size of
the local labor markets in which it was acquired. To provide such insights, is the main contribution of this paper.
In contrast to previous papers, I explicitly estimate the elasticity of wage with respect to the size of the local
labor market in which work experience was acquired, employing a micro-econometric framework described by
Combes and Gobillon (2015) and taking into account that accumulated human capital depreciates over time.
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The latter implies that the impact of a labor market’s size on wage is expected to be lower the more time has
passed since experience was acquired in that specific labor market.
Using administrative data from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) on individual employment bi-
ographies, I am able to follow a worker’s employment history back to 1975 and observe the size of all regional
labor markets in Germany in which he or she acquired work experience. This information is used to estimate
the extent to which wages depend on the size of the labor market where previous work experience was acquired.
The wage information refers to individual new employment relationships in Germany starting between 2005
and 2011. These wages contain important information as to how firms value work experience when they hire a
worker depending on the size of the labor market in which it was acquired. By considering the wages associ-
ated with new employment relationships, I reduce the risk of an omitted variable bias since other factors which
are unobserved by the econometrician gain importance for productivity as tenure increases, like professional
development training offered by the firm (Hamann et al., 2016).
The identified dynamic agglomeration benefit should be strongly related to learning externalities. I control for
sorting of more able workers into large labor markets and static agglomeration benefits by means of individual
as well as region fixed effects. Furthermore, I include the number of previous employers in order to control for
dynamic matching according to the coordination hypothesis. Time varying individual characteristics and the
individual labor market biographies of the workers are considered, as well as time varying characteristics of the
local industry.
This paper also takes into account that large local labor markets are typically not only characterized by a large
workforce but also by an above average share of high-skilled labor. Presuming that those workers one learns
from the most are the skilled ones, the question arises whether dynamic agglomeration gains in general, and
learning benefits in particular, stem from the large local workforce or from the high share of high-skilled labor.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2 I review the corresponding literature with
a focus on learning externalities. In section 3.3 I describe the methodology of my empirical analysis and in
section 3.4 the data set. In section 3.5 I discuss the results of my empirical analysis and finally, in section 3.6 I
set out my conclusions.
3.2 Related literature
Puga (2010) as well as Combes and Gobillon (2015), who review the literature on the magnitude and causes
of agglomeration economies, conclude that most empirical studies analyze the overall impact of local charac-
teristics on some local outcome rather than the importance of the different mechanisms behind agglomeration
economies. Furthermore, they note, the role of learning in cities in particular is still an open question and
further work is needed to fully understand the impact of this underlying mechanism.
In his paper ’Learning in Cities’ Glaeser (1999: 255) state that “the primary informational role of cities may
not be in creating cutting edge technologies, but rather in creating learning opportunities for everyday people”.
Chapter 3: Quantifying the effect of labor market size on learning externalities 35
He argues that agglomeration fosters individual learning opportunities since the latter increase with the rate of
new contacts between individuals and this is highest in a dense urban environment.
Although it is still an open question how to provide micro-foundations for the assumption that the learning
function increases with the local number of skilled workers one can learn from (Duranton/Puga, 2004), there is
empirical evidence that wages in large cities grow faster than elsewhere and one mechanism behind this phe-
nomenon may be learning externalities. Glaeser and Maré (2001) were the first who empirically analyzed why
density increases individual productivity, addressing sorting of more productive workers into cities by means
of individual fixed effects. To disentangle static and dynamic agglomeration benefits, Glaeser and Maré (2001)
analyze wages of migrants within the United States, where they find evidence of both types of agglomeration
benefits. Rural-to-urban migrants receive quickly a wage increase which points to static agglomeration benefits.
In addition, the urban-to-rural wage premium increases after migration with the amount of time spent in cities
which points to dynamic agglomeration benefits. Furthermore, the results support the hypothesis that dynamic
agglomeration benefits are at least partly based on learning effects. Wages decline only little when a worker
migrates from a metropolitan to a rural area.
As emphasized by Wheeler (2006) and Yankow (2006) dynamic agglomeration benefits may not only arise due
to learning effects but also due to improved firm-worker matches over time. It relates to benefits of searching
jobs in urban rather than in non-urban labor markets. In urban areas the number of job openings is larger and
search costs are lower. According to this ’coordination hypothesis’, wage growth in cities should be related to
job changes rather than to faster wage growth on a job. To differentiate between learning and dynamic matching
effects, both authors suggest to distinguish between within-job and between-job wage growth. If within-job
wage growth is larger in urban than in non-urban labor markets, this supports the learning hypothesis. Evidence
of faster between-job wage growth in big cities would support the idea of improved dynamic matching.
Similarly to Glaeser and Maré (2001), Wheeler (2006) as well as Yankow (2006) find that an important part of
the urban wage premium is a wage growth effect. Like Glaeser and Maré (2001), both analyze wage effects
based on migrants between rural and urban regions (and vice versa). Yankow (2006) focuses on the role of
between-job wage growth as a driver of the urban wage growth premium. He finds that the wage gain per
job change does not significantly differ between urban and non-urban regions. However, he observes that the
number of job changes is larger in big cities. This suggests that parts of the dynamic agglomeration benefit are
based on more frequent job changes in cities. The role of learning effects is not explicitly analyzed by Yankow
(2006).
In contrast, Wheeler (2006) considers both: between-job and within-job wage growth. He finds evidence in
favor of the coordination hypothesis, as labor market density has a positive impact on between-job wage growth.
However, this result is not robust when individual fixed effects are included in the analysis. With regard to
within-job wage growth, Wheeler (2006) finds no significant impact of the local labor market, using three
different measures of local market scale. D’Costa and Overman (2014), who control for unobserved individual
characteristics that impact on wage growth, obtain a similar result for Great Britain, when they compare wage
growth of workers who move from rural to urban areas with workers who stay in rural areas. However, they
observe for rural workers who “worked in a city at some point” (D’Costa/Overman, 2014: 174) a faster wage
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growth compared to rural workers with no city experience. Once city experience is taken into account, they
find that workers who have either current or past experience in an urban environment benefit from faster wage
growth than workers who have never had any urban experience. Furthermore, their results indicate that the
wage growth of rural workers with past urban experience are based on within-job wage growth. D’Costa and
Overman (2014) interpret this finding as evidence in favor of the learning hypothesis. Individuals with past
urban experience are able to make use of their accumulated knowledge even after relocating to rural areas.
Lehmer and Möller (2010) examine, among other questions, whether faster wage growth in urban regions is
tied to the firm level or whether there is evidence of externalities provided by the urban environment. They
analyze the wage effects of mobility between firms as well as between regions for Germany, distinguishing
between small and large firms as well as between rural and urban regions. Their findings suggest that wage
gains of moving from small to large firms increase in the years after migration, pointing to faster knowledge
accumulation within large firms. However, even controlling for this effect, Lehmer and Möller (2010) provide
evidence that wages in urban areas grow at a higher rate than wages in rural areas. This supports the view that
the urban environment fosters the individual accumulation of knowledge as well.
“Currently one of the most complete studies on the topic” (Combes/Gobillon, 2015: 263) is the one by De la
Roca and Puga (2016).3 As with previous authors, they control for unobserved individual characteristics that
impact on the individual wage level and distinguish static and dynamic effects. De la Roca and Puga (2016)
provide empirical evidence that strongly suggest that dynamic benefits depend on learning effects. In order
to identify dynamic agglomeration economies, they do not analyze individual wage growth after migrating
from rural to urban areas like the studies discussed so far, but instead analyze the value of individual work
experience, depending on the size of the city in which it was acquired. They distinguish experience that was
acquired in three groups of Spanish cities. Their results show that experience acquired in the largest Spanish
cities has the highest value. In addition, experience acquired in the next largest cities is also more valuable
than experience acquired in the rest of the county. It suggests that a worker accumulates in a large city per
unit of experience more valuable human capital than in a small city. Similar results for Italy are obtained by
Matano and Naticchioni (2016) focusing on young workers, and by Hamann et al. (2016) for Germany when
analyzing transitions to employment. The latter find that employers value work experience higher when they
hire a new employee if experience was acquired in agglomerations rather than in less dense local labor markets.
This manifests in higher wages.
De la Roca and Puga (2016) also provide evidence for the learning hypothesis as a driver of the urban wage
growth premium. They find that the additional value of experience acquired in the biggest Spanish cities does
not significantly change when a worker leaves the largest cities to work somewhere else.
Some authors also provide evidence of heterogeneity in dynamic agglomeration benefits, depending on indi-
vidual characteristics. The results by Glaeser and Maré (2001) suggest that the urban wage growth premium
is larger for younger than for older workers. Results obtained by D’Costa and Overman (2014) support this
finding.
3 Combes and Gobillon (2015) refer to an earlier version of De la Roca/Puga (2016).
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De la Roca and Puga (2016) observe that particularly workers with a high ‘innate ability’, measured by in-
dividual fixed effects, benefit from working in large cities through learning effects. In contrast, Matano and
Naticchioni (2016) find for Italy that workers at the bottom of the wage distribution experience a stronger wage
increase in the years after a move from a province of low to a province of high density than workers at the
top of the wage distribution. For the latter, they also observe a significant static wage premium. Matano and
Naticchioni (2016) also distinguish benefits of firm tenure (as a proxy for within-job wage growth) and job
changes. Their results indicate that workers at the bottom of the wage distribution benefit from tenure, pointing
to learning effects. For workers at the top of the wage distribution tenure is according to Matano and Natic-
chioni (2016) less important. This group benefits rather from job changes, indicating that highly dense regions
promote the efficiency of matches between firms and workers.
Gould (2007) and Andersson et al. (2014) also provide evidence of heterogeneous learning effects. Gould
(2007) applies a structural model that accounts for the endogeneity of location choices, and finds for the United
States that work experience in a city significantly increases the wage of white-collar workers, even after re-
location to the rural area. For blue-collar workers he does not find such an effect. Andersson et al. (2014)
distinguish workers according to tasks. They find that workers with a high fraction of non-routine tasks receive
a higher wage after a move from Sweden’s three largest metropolitan regions to the rest of the country than
workers that previously did not work in one of the large local labor markets. For workers with a low fraction of
non-routine tasks they do not observe corresponding wage differentials.
The literature discussed so far focuses on externalities arising from the spatial concentration of economic ac-
tivity and employment. However, a related strand of literature exists that discusses the role of local learning
externalities as well (Heuermann et al., 2010). This strand analyzes the external effects of localized human
capital. It focuses on the composition of the local workforce with respect to skills, rather than on labor market
size. Comprehensive overviews are given by Moretti (2004b) and Duranton (2007).
To analyze human capital externalities, typically some indicator for productivity is regressed on the share of
(high-)skilled workers in local employment. As summarized by Heuermann et al. (2010), one underlying mech-
anism on why local human capital impacts on wages is that firms invest more in physical capital when they are
located in a human capital intensive region. This increases also the productivity of low-skilled workers through
working with a larger stock of physical capital.4 Another reason why localized human capital is supposed to
impact on individual productivity is learning externalities. Already List (1838) noted, the interaction of skilled
and unskilled workers presumably leads to imitations by the latter. Furthermore, skilled workers are expected
to benefit from each other because meetings between skilled workers with different ideas might generate new
ideas and knowledge (Jovanovic/Rob, 1989).
Empirical evidence of productivity effects of local human capital is provided by, e.g., Moretti (2004c). He finds
that the value added of manufacturing plants grows faster in those cities in the Unites States in which the share
4 The argument for the larger investment in physical capital is that physical and human capital are complementary in the production
process and that firms anticipate that the contemporary aggregate level of human capital determines future educational attainments
(Heuermann et al., 2010).
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of college graduates increases at a higher rate than in other cities. However, most frequently human capital
externalities are analyzed by comparing wages of workers across cities with differing levels of human capital
(Heuermann et al., 2010), among others Moretti (2004a) for the United States and Heuermann (2011) as well
as Braakmann (2009) for Germany.
One difficulty when analyzing the impact of an increasing local share of skilled labor on individual productivity
is the identification of the externality effect. As stressed by Moretti (2004a) and Ciccone and Peri (2006) and
reviewed by Combes and Gobillon (2015) not only human capital externalities are at work, but individual wages
also depend on the composition of the local workforce due to the imperfect substitutability between workers of
different skill levels. If this is not taken into account, only a composite effect is identified.
Furthermore, Combes and Gobillon (2015) note that most studies focusing on localized human capital exter-
nalities neglect that the degree of agglomeration, and the regional share of high-skilled labor, are typically
correlated. Most of these studies only consider the share of high-skilled labor and no other regional char-
acteristic in their empirical analysis. Therefore, the human capital variable likely also captures the effect of
other regional characteristics such as labor market density (Combes/Gobillon, 2015). An exception is, e.g.,
Heuermann (2011) who controls for the density of the local labor market.
Vice versa, if only density is considered, as typically done by the literature on the urban wage premium dis-
cussed above, the identified effect might also capture the effect of the high share of high-skilled labor. However,
Heuermann et al. (2010) as well as Combes and Gobillon (2015) argue that the latter effect may be interpreted
as one channel of agglomeration economies. It may reinforce local learning opportunities in large labor mar-
kets.
Taken together, the existing literature on dynamic agglomeration economies predominantly analyzes whether
workers migrating from non-urban to urban areas experience thereafter a faster wage growth than workers
who remain in non-urban areas (Glaeser/Maré, 2001; Yankow, 2006; Lehmer/Möller, 2010; D’Costa/Overman,
2014; Matano/Naticchioni, 2016). Even though the results are heterogeneous, the overall impression is that
wage growth in urban areas is in fact stronger than in non-urban areas. In addition, there is also evidence that
workers who migrate from urban to non-urban areas thereafter still benefit from their work experience acquired
in the urban labor market. This is typically interpreted as support for the learning hypothesis. However, the
magnitude of dynamic gains, depending on the size of the local labor market in which experience was acquired,
has not been analyzed by these studies.
Inspired by the work of De la Roca and Puga (2016), a few studies recently estimated the value of work
experience by cities. They distinguish two or three classes of large cities and compare the value of work
experience acquired there to the value of work experience acquired in the rest of the country. In line with the
learning hypothesis they find a positive relationship between the value of city-class experience and the size of
the cities within the class. This indicates that a worker accumulates more human capital per unit of experience
the larger the local labor market is in which experience is acquired. However, general conclusions with regard
to the impact of city size on learning benefits are difficult as these studies distinguish only very few cities.
Chapter 3: Quantifying the effect of labor market size on learning externalities 39
Furthermore, the underlying mechanisms remain unclear, i.e., which characteristics of urban labor markets are
important for the emergence of learning externalities. Is it a scale effect, meaning the large number of workers
who provide different ideas and knowledge or, as suggested by the literature on human capital externalities, the
typically high share of high-skilled labor in urban labor markets?
Distinguishing experience acquired in 141 German labor market regions in the period 1975-2011, this paper
explicitly estimates the impact of labor market size on dynamic agglomeration benefits taking into account the
depreciation of human capital and the composition of a region’s local labor force with respect to the skill level.
The identified effects are supposed to be strongly related to learning externalities. I focus on wages associated
with transitions to new employment relationships that indicate how firms value previous work experience when
they hire a worker. Furthermore, I control for various other channels of agglomeration economies and show
that the value of experience predominately is determined by the size of the labor market in which experience
was acquired and portable to other regions.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Empirical model
In order to quantify the benefit of acquiring work experience in large local labor markets, I analyze the wages
associated with new employment relationships after transitions to employment. These wages contain important
information on how firms value previously acquired work experience when they hire a new employee. As tenure
increases, other factors which are unobserved by the econometrician will gain importance for productivity, like
on-the-job and professional development training offered by the firm (Hamann et al., 2016). Hence, considering
the wage of newly established employment relationships reduces the risk of an omitted variable bias.
In my analysis, I make use of a micro-econometric framework described by Combes and Gobillon (2015).
Suppose a worker i is hired by an establishment at date t and the logarithm of the wage which the worker
receives, wi,t , is given by equation (3.1); compare Combes and Gobillon (2015: eq. 5.20).
wi,t = ui+µr(i,t),y(t)+
t−1
∑
τ=1
I(Oi,τ = 1)×νr(i,τ),τ,r(i,t)+x′i,tβ + εi,t (3.1)
ui denotes an individual fixed effect and µr,y(t) a fixed effect for local labor market r, i.e., the labor market
individual i starts to work in at date t. These fixed effects are allowed to vary across years y. Oi,τ is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if individual i was working in the past at date τ and 0 else. νs,τ,r is a time varying
fixed effect for working at date τ in region s and at date t in region r.5 xi,t is a vector of time-varying individual
characteristics with parameter vector β and εi,t is an error term. In the empirical analysis subscript t refers to
days between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2011 and τ = 1 to January 1, 1975.
5 It is important to distinguish the subscripts s and r. s = r(i,τ) denotes the labor market in which worker i acquired experience at date
τ . r = r(i, t) indicates in which local labor market individual i starts to work at date t.
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The worker fixed effect captures all unobserved time-invariant characteristics of a worker that determine the
individual wage. The region-year fixed effect refers to the region specific productivity level that is based on
static local effects which may vary over time. Dynamic local effects are captured by I(Oi,τ = 1)×νs,τ,r. Given
that individual i was working at date τ which is indicated by Oi,τ , the parameter νs,τ,r can be interpreted as the
weight of the work experience that individual i acquired at date τ . This marginal value of experience depends
on the labor market and date of acquirement, indicated by s and τ , respectively, and the labor market in which
the experience is used, r. ∑t−1τ=1 I(Oi,τ = 1)×νs,τ,r captures the wage premium that individual i receives at date
t due to his or her entire work experience acquired until date t−1.6
Imagine, I ignore that the value of experience depends on the time and the location of its acquirement and on
where it is used, then, νs,τ,r = ν and (3.1) reduces to a frequently applied Mincer type wage equation:
wi,t = ui+µr(i,t),y(t)+νEi,t +x′i,tβ + εi,t , (3.2)
where Ei,t denotes the total amount of work experience which is given by the number of days of employment
until date t− 1, i.e., Ei,t = ∑t−1τ=1 I(Oi,τ = 1). In both equations, (3.1) and (3.2), ν revers to the marginal value
of work experience. In (3.1) it is allowed to vary across labor markets, in (3.2) it is not.
In order to identify dynamic agglomeration economies based on (3.1), Combes and Gobillon (2015) suggest a
two-step procedure. The first step requires to estimate νs,τ,r for all combinations of s, t and r, in addition to
all other parameters of equation (3.1). In a second step, the estimated parameters νˆs,τ,r are regressed on local
characteristics such as labor market size to quantify its impact on the marginal value of experience. A severe
problem of this approach is that the number of parameters which have to be estimated in the first step amounts
to the square of the number of labor market regions times the number of considered dates (Combes/Gobillon,
2015). Moreover, it is not possible to take into account that the marginal return to experience acquired in labor
market s at date τ may vary across individuals depending on the amount of previously acquired experience (see
below).
De la Roca and Puga (2016) estimate a special case of equation (3.1) where they impose restrictions on νs,τ,r
such that the number of parameters reduces. Using Spanish data, they distinguish experience only according to
three classes of cities in which it was acquired: in Madrid/Barcelona, Valencia/Sevilla/Zaragoza, or elsewhere
in Spain. Furthermore, they assume that the value of experience acquired in one of the classes does not depend
on the day when it was acquired. In this case, equation (3.1) simplifies to (3.3); compare De la Roca and Puga
(2016: eq. 1).
wi,t = ui+µr(i,t),y(t)+
3
∑
s=1
νs,r(i,t)Ei,s,t +x′i,tβ + εi,t (3.3)
Ei,s,t denotes the amount of experience that was acquired until t − 1 in, respectively, Madrid or Barcelona,
Valencia, Sevilla, or Zaragoza, or elsewhere in Spain. This approach enables to compare the marginal value
of experience acquired in different groups of cities to assess the magnitude of dynamic agglomeration benefits.
6 Because information on self-employment is not available, I only consider spells of employment subject to social security contribution
when measuring work experience. In this specification, I assume that human capital which was accumulated while working does not
depreciate over time; compare, e.g., De la Roca and Puga (2016), Matano and Naticchioni (2016). This assumption is relaxed below.
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However, to obtain general results with regard to the impact of labor market size on dynamic gains is difficult.
The two-step procedure suggested by Combes and Gobillon (2015) requires in the first step not only few
parameters νs,τ,r to be estimated, but many.
I adopt the strategy by De la Roca and Puga (2016) as a point of departure and estimate a model such as
(3.3) where I distinguish only between two groups of German labor markets. Thereafter, I apply an alternative
estimation strategy that is also discussed by Combes and Gobillon (2015) in order to obtain more general
results. I express νs,τ,r in (3.1) by a function of labor market size, equivalent to the second step of the two-step
procedure and estimate to which extent wages associated with new employment relationships depend on the
size of the labor market in which experience was acquired. At this point, I assume that the value of experience
is only determined by the size of the labor market where experience was acquired and does not vary depending
on where it is used, i.e., νs,τ,r = νs,τ . This assumption is relaxed at the end of my analysis. Furthermore, I
follow Combes et al. (2008), Andersson et al. (2014), De la Roca and Puga (2016), and others, and assume that
there is a log-linear relationship between net-agglomeration gains and labor market size denoted by Zs,τ . More
precisely, I assume that νs,τ is given by equation (3.4). It may be interpreted as a learning function capturing
externalities of acquiring work experience in large local labor markets.7
νs,τ =
δ ln
(
Zs,τ
Z
)
if Zs,τ > Z
0 else
(3.4)
In accordance with Duranton and Puga (2004), marginal learning benefits with regard to labor market size are
assumed to be positive but decreasing. δ ln
(
Zs,τ
Z
)
denotes the value of the additional human capital that a
worker accumulates by working at date τ in a labor market with size Zs,τ , given the labor market size exceeds
a certain (unknown) threshold Z. If the local labor market is smaller than Z, a worker does not acquire any
knowledge he or she can make use of in the future.8 In order to obtain the baseline model of my empirical
analysis, I rewrite the learning function such that it is given by:
νs,τ =
γ+δ lnZs,τ if Zs,τ > Z0 else, (3.5)
with γ =−δ lnZ. Given that Zs,τ is always larger than Z, inserting (3.5) into (3.1) leads to:
wi,t = ui+µr(i,t),y(t)+ γEi,t +δ
t−1
∑
τ=1
I(Oi,τ = 1)× zr(i,τ),τ +x′i,tβ + εi,t , (3.6)
with zs,τ = lnZs,τ and Ei,t being individual work experience measured by the number of days a worker was
employed before date t (compare equation (3.2)). After estimating equation (3.6) it has to be verified whether
7 Combes and Gobillon (2015) state that external effects do not need to depend only on the size, but also on other regional characteristics
of labor market s. Later in my paper, I also take into account the skill structure of the local labor force. Thereby, I also address that
Duranton and Puga (2004) argue that the learning function depends on the local amount of skilled labor.
8 I gratefully thank Johannes Bröcker for the suggestion to introduce Z in the learning function.
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all local labor markets are indeed larger than Zˆ which is given by exp(−γˆ/δˆ ). If some local labor markets are
smaller than Zˆ, the size of the respective labor market has to be set to Zˆ (leaving Ei,t unchanged) and an iterative
procedure has to be applied in order to obtain the solution for equation (3.4).
∑t−1τ=1 I(Oi,τ = 1)× zr(i,τ),τ in equation (3.6) may be interpreted as the total number of local learning opportuni-
ties of individual i until date t−1 depending on the size of the labor markets in which experience was acquired.
The corresponding parameter δ denotes the elasticity of wage with respect to the size of the labor market in
which individual i was working at one day in the past. Accordingly, the productivity at date t as reflected in
wage would be δEi,t percent higher if all labor markets individual i was working in before would have been
on average one percent larger. For interpretation it is important to note that the partial derivative of wi,t with
respect to νs,τ is unity, given that individual i was employed at date τ (see equation 3.1). Therefore, the esti-
mated elasticity of wage with respect to the size of the labor market in which experience was acquired can also
be interpreted as the elasticity of the marginal value of experience with respect to labor market size (compare
equation 3.4).
So far, I implicitly assumed that human capital does not depreciate over time. However, there are good reasons
to believe that its value decreases the more time passes. This might be caused by, i.a., changes in the skills
demanded for a particular job due to technological change, shifts in the demand for particular occupations due
to changes in the industry structure, or since certain knowledge and skills get lost because they are insufficiently
used (De Grip/Van Loo, 2002). Taking this into account, I augment the learning function such that the value of
work experience acquired by working at date τ , I(Oi,τ = 1)×νs,τ,r in equation (3.1), is given by equation (3.7).9
θ denotes the rate by which previously acquired human capital depreciates per day and Qi,τ is the value of the
human capital, as given by equation (3.8), that individual i accumulated before date τ evaluated at the beginning
of τ .10 Hence, −θQi,τ denotes the daily loss in the value of previously accumulated human capital. It implies
that the marginal change in the value of the individual stock of human capital at date τ is positive if and only if
individual i acquires a sufficient amount of new human capital at date τ by working in a sufficiently large labor
market.
I(Oi,τ = 1)×νs,τ,i =
δ ln
(
Zs,τ
Z
)
−θQi,τ if Zs,τ > Z and Oi,τ = 1
−θQi,τ else
(3.7)
with Qi,1 = 0 and
Qi,τ =
τ−1
∑
k=1
I(Oi,k = 1)×νr(i,k),k,i (3.8)
for τ > 1.
9 In equation (3.7), I still assume that the value of previously acquired work experience is the same in all labor markets.
10 θ is supposed to be in the interval (0;1). The marginal value of experience acquired in labor market s at date τ now varies across
individuals. Therefore, I add the subscript i.
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Since I(Oi,τ = 1)× νs,τ,i is defined as Qi,τ+1−Qi,τ , equation (3.7) corresponds to the first order difference
equation given by (3.9).11 Its solution is given by equation (3.10). For details see appendix 3.A.
Qi,τ+1 =
δ ln
(
Zs,τ
Z
)
+(1−θ)Qi,τ if Zs,τ > Z and Oi,τ = 1
(1−θ)Qi,τ else
(3.9)
Qi,τ = δ
τ−1
∑
k=1
I(Oi,k = 1)×max
{
ln
(
Zr(i,k),k
Z
)
;0
}
× (1−θ)τ−k−1 (3.10)
Hence, the value of human capital acquired before date τ , Qi,τ , is proportional to the weighted sum of the size
of all labor markets in which previous work experience was acquired. For k = τ−1, the weight (1−θ)τ−k−1
equals one, meaning that the size of the labor market in which a worker acquired work experience at the previous
day is not discounted. In contrast, the size of the labor market in which the first day of experience was acquired
has the lowest weight, (1−θ)τ−2, addressing that the value of the human capital acquired at this day declined
each day after acquisition by rate θ .
In order to obtain estimates for θ , δ , and Z based on the augmented learning function given by equation (3.7),
I again replace lnZ by −γ/δ such that equation (3.10) can be written as:
Qi,τ = γ
τ−1
∑
k=1
I(Oi,k = 1)× (1−θ)τ−k−1+
+δ
τ−1
∑
k=1
I(Oi,k = 1)×max
{
lnZr(i,k),k; lnZ
}× (1−θ)τ−k−1. (3.11)
Replacing the term ∑t−1τ=1 I(Oi,τ = 1)×νr(i,τ),τ,r(i,t) in equation (3.1) by this expression yields equation (3.12).12
Recall that both, ∑t−1τ=1 I(Oi,τ = 1)×νr(i,τ),τ,r(i,t) as well as Qi,t , denote the value of experience acquired before
date t.
wi,t = ui+µr(i,t),y(t)+ γ
t−1
∑
τ=1
I(Oi,τ = 1)× (1−θ)t−τ−1+
+δ
t−1
∑
τ=1
I(Oi,τ = 1)× zr(i,τ),τ × (1−θ)t−τ−1+x′i,tβ + εi,t (3.12)
According to equation (3.12) the productivity of worker i at date t, as reflected in wage wi,t , depends, like in
equation (3.6), on the size of all labor markets in which i worked previously. However, (3.12) takes into account
that having recently benefited from acquiring experience in a large labor market may increase today’s produc-
tivity stronger than agglomeration economies experienced years ago. The crucial parameter is θ . The larger
θ is, the relatively larger is the productivity effect of the size of the labor markets in which recent experience
11 I gratefully thank Johannes Bröcker for pointing this out and to give me the decisive hint how to obtain the solution of (3.9) referring
to Sydsæter et al.
12 Again, I assume that all labor markets are larger than threshold Z. This assumption has to be verified after an estimate for Z is obtained.
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was acquired. Since equation (3.12) is highly non-linear in θ , maximum likelihood estimation is applied. For
θ = 0, equation (3.12) simplifies to the baseline model given by equation (3.6).
After estimating equations (3.6) and (3.12) which are based on the assumption that the value of experience is
the same in all labor markets, I let the parameters of the learning function vary across different groups of local
labor markets which are defined according to their size. This provides evidence as to whether the value of
experience depends only on the size of the labor market in which experience was acquired or also on the size
of the labor market in which it is used.
3.3.2 Econometric issues
When analyzing the impact of labor market size on wages, endogeneity has to be taken into account. A detailed
discussion is provided by Combes et al. (2011). The risk of biased estimates due to omitted variables should
be reduced by the setup of my empirical analysis. I control for all time-invariant characteristics of the worker
by means of individual fixed effects as well as for time-varying characteristics like educational degree and
pre-employment status. Region-year fixed effects control for all time-variant and time-invariant characteristics
of the local labor market that lead to static regional wage differentials. In addition, I consider observable
characteristics of the local industry, skill specific local unemployment rates as well as industry fixed effects.
The latter capture all time-invariant industry specific factors that have an impact on the wage.
Also the risk of reverse causality should be of minor concern here. The pivotal explanatory variable is the size
of the labor markets in which an individual acquired experience before date t, not the size of the labor market
at the date at which the analyzed wage is paid. Of course, the size of the labor market in which experience has
been acquired and where it is used are likely significantly correlated. However, the included region-year fixed
effects control for all characteristics of the region in which individual i works at date t, including its size.
As noted by Combes and Gobillon (2015), a second econometric issue that has to be discussed refers to the
computation of standard errors. Moulton (1990) shows that it is important to account for cross-sectional corre-
lation in the error terms if a model explains individual outcomes by characteristics of the regional environment.
As matrix Xi,t also contains information of the local industry, the appropriate solution would be to cluster the
standard errors at the local industry level. However, this is not possible as the model includes individual fixed
effects and because workers are mobile between regions and industries. The standard errors that I report are
clustered at individual level. They are robust with regard to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error
terms (Wooldridge, 2013).13
13 I obtain very similar standard errors if I compute them as suggested by Driscoll and Kraay (1998). Those standard errors are robust to
general forms of cross-sectional and serial dependence in the error terms (see also Hoechle, 2007). The additional results are available
upon request.
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3.4 Data
3.4.1 Individual data set
In order to quantify the impact of labor market size on the value of work experience, I analyze wages of 525,265
new employment relationships in Germany within the period 2005 to 2011. The new employment relationships
are identified using detailed information on individual labor market biographies. The latter also enable to
observe where and when work experience was acquired as information on the date and location of previous
spells of employment is available.
The information on labor market biographies is taken from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of the
Institute for Employment Research (IAB). Among other information, the IEB contains very reliable micro data
on employment which comes from the integrated notification procedure for health, pension and unemployment
insurance.14 My data set comprises a 5 percent random sample of all employees with at least one notification
to social security between 2005 and 2011.15
I exclude all individuals for which it is not possible to observe the full employment biography. The setup of my
analysis requires information on all locations where previous work experience was acquired.16 Among others, I
exclude all individuals born before 1960 because the IEB contains only information on employment from 1975
onwards. A detailed description is provided in appendix 3.B. For the remaining sample of workers my data
set captures all spells of employment subject to social security contributions. I use them to identify transitions
to employment within the period between 2005 and 2011 focusing on new full-time employment outside the
public sector and outside the temporary employment industry. For the new employment relationships I observe
the corresponding gross daily wage as well as further information on the new job (e.g., kind of occupation) and
the worker (e.g., age, educational attainment and sex). The wage information in the IEB is right censored, as
firms report earnings only up to the upper limit for social security contributions. Therefore, I partly impute the
wages, see appendix 3.B.
Using information on all previous spells of employment, I compute the individual labor market experience at
the date at which the new employment relationship starts. Moreover, I generate important control variables that
provide information on the recent labor market biography with respect to the pre-employment status, length of
non-employment before the transition to employment, unemployment benefits, and participation in measures of
active labor market policy. The information is also taken from the IEB. Detailed information on all variables that
I use is provided by table 3.B.1 in appendix 3.B. Summary statistics can be found in table 3.C.1 in appendix 3.C.
Descriptive statistics indicate that a large share of the considered new employment relationships refers to rather
young workers with few years of labor market experience. One likely explanation is that workers change jobs
14 For a more detailed description of the IEB see vom Berge et al. (2013).
15 Hamann et al. (2016) use the described data set to analyze the impact of labor market density on the quality of matches between job
seekers and vacancies.
16 The IEB does not contain information on the self-employed and civil servants. Therefore, my analysis is based on information on
employment subject to social security contributions only.
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more frequently when they are young to find the job they like most as noted by Wheeler (2008). The mean
work experience in my data set amounts to about 9.4 years. The analyses by Glaeser and Maré (2001), Wheeler
(2006), Yankow (2006) as well as Gould (2007) are based on a data set with a similar sample mean.17
The establishment identifier in the IEB is used to identify the number of different establishments an individual
was working in before the considered new employment relationship. I use this information as a control variable
addressing that frequent job changes are discussed to improve the matching between firms and workers.18
Additionally, the establishment identifier allows me to add important information on the establishment to the
individual data set, e.g., location, industry, establishment size as well as skill and age structure of the staff. The
data is taken from the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
I also merge information on the local industry as well as on skill specific local unemployment rates. I compute
corresponding indicators based on data taken from the (un-)employment statistics of the Federal Employment
Agency (FEA).
3.4.2 The size of local labor markets
Di Addario and Patacchini (2008) show for Italy that the effect of local density on wages rapidly declines in
distance. Only for population mass within a distance up to 12 kilometers, they find a significant impact on
wages. It indicates that agglomeration benefits depend on the immediate environment.
Taking this into account and addressing that learning externalities are thought to crucially depend on interac-
tion between individuals, I choose labor market regions as spatial units for my analysis. They are supposed
to represent integrated local labor markets and have on average a radius of about 27 km (see table 3.1). Their
definition is taken from Kosfeld and Werner (2012), who define 141 regional labor market regions employing a
factor analysis to German commuter structure between NUTS-3 regions. Because the regions contain NUTS-3
regions connected through intense commuting, I assume that workers exchange knowledge exclusively within
these regions and that their size in terms of employment is an appropriate measure for local learning opportu-
nities.
One critical issue is that commuting patterns change of over time, wherefore the chosen definition of labor
market regions might be an inappropriate approximation of local labor markets decades ago. However, when
estimating equation (3.6) which is based on the simplified learning function, the within transformation that
is applied to eliminate the individual fixed effect wipes out all information on experience that was acquired
before the date at which the first analyzed new employment relationship of worker i started. Hence, in the
baseline specification δˆ and γˆ are only based on information that refers to the period 2005 to 2011. Estimat-
ing equation (3.12) which is based on the augmented learning function, requires information on all previous
employment spells of a worker. In this case, the size of the labor market in which experience was acquired is
17 Gould (2007) uses the same data set as the other authors, but does not provide summary statistics in his paper.
18 Different units of one firm that are located in different municipalities are considered as independent establishments. It is not possible
to identify whether different establishments belong to the same firm.
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weighted lower the more additional experience was acquired thereafter; see also equation (3.10). Nevertheless,
as a robustness check, I repeat my estimations focusing on those workers who only acquired work experience
in 1995 or later, i.e., at least five years after reunification of East and West Germany. Overall, the results based
on the full sample are confirmed as discussed in the next section.
Table 3.1: Size of German labor market regions
Local labor market size in terms of. . .
radius thousand share of
in km† employees‡ high-skilled labor§
Minimum 10.3 13.8 2.3
Median 26.0 110.8 6.0
Mean 27.0 179.1 7.0
Maximum 51.8 1206.5 20.0
N=141.
† Under the assumption that the regions are circular. ‡ Number of employees subject to social security contributions. § Share of workers
with a university degree.
Note: Definition of the regions according to Kosfeld and Werner (2012). The statistics are averages for the considered period, i.e., for
West Germany 1975-2011, for East Germany 1993-2011.
Local learning externalities should crucially depend on the amount of localized knowledge and ideas. I ap-
proximate this amount by the number of employees working in a labor market. The data is taken from the
Employment History of the IAB and refers to annual regional employment at June 30th. The size of the labor
market regions in terms of employment varies between 14 thousand and 1,2 million employees (region specific
averages, see table 3.1).
After identifying the effect of total regional employment on the value of experience as reflected in higher future
wages, I analyze to which extent the dynamic agglomeration benefit may be explained by an above average
share of high-skilled labor within large urbanized labor markets. I define this as the local share of workers with
a university degree which varies between two percent and 20 percent (see table 3.1). The correlation between
total regional employment and the local share of high-skilled workers is 0.38.
3.4.3 The mobility of labor
The mobility of labor is an important aspect as it determines to which extent learning benefits manifest in
regional wage disparities. Considering a certain degree of learning externalities, wage disparities between
small and large local labor markets arise if workers are immobile between local labor markets that differ in
size since then, individuals who work in large local labor markets accumulated in the past, ceteris paribus, on
average more human capital than individuals working the same number of days in small local labor markets.
Descriptive statistics show that a worker acquired work experience in either small or large local labor markets.
Mobility between labor markets that significantly differ in size is rather low. Table 3.2 provides information
on the ratio of the size of the largest labor market and the size of the smallest labor market in which a worker
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acquired experience before one of the considered new employment relationships. In more than 60 percent of
the observations the largest labor market was less than twice as large as the smallest labor market, and in less
than ten percent more than ten times as large.19
Table 3.2: The size of the largest labor market in which a worker
acquired experience relative to size of the smallest labor market
Percentile Size of largest labor marketSize of smallest labor market
5 1.020
10 1.037
20 1.059
30 1.085
40 1.145
50 1.268
60 1.806
70 3.055
80 4.879
90 9.004
95 14.181
N=525,265.
Note: For each considered new employment relationship I identified the largest and the smallest labor market in which the respective
worker previously acquired experience. The size of the local labor markets is measured in terms of number of employees and varies
across years.
Table 3.3 compares the size of the labor markets where experience was acquired and where it is used distin-
guishing five categories of labor market regions according to their size. In 61 percent of all considered new
employment relationships the new employer is located in a region that belongs to the same category as the
average region in which experience was acquired (main diagonal), in 25 percent the current region is larger
than previous ones (upper triangle) and in 14 percent smaller (lower triangle).
Workers are not only rather immobile between local labor markets that belong to different categories as defined
in table 3.3, but also between labor markets that are of a comparable size. The sample mean of total work
experience is 9.4 years (see table 3.C.1). On average, 59 percent of this previous work experience (5.7 years)
refer to employment in the same labor market in which the new employer is located. The median amounts to 79
percent. 36 percent of the workers acquired all their work experience in that particular region. On the opposite,
25 percent of the workers were never previously employed in the region in which the new employer is located.
Taken together, workers tend to continue to work in the labor market in which they acquired experience, or in
a region of a comparable size. Therefore, if the individual accumulation of knowledge is significantly larger
in large than in small local labor markets, as proposed by the learning hypothesis, it likely results in wage
disparities between small and large regions.
In order to test the hypothesis that the value of work experience depends not only on the size of the labor market
in which experience was acquired, but also on the size of the labor market in which it is used, it requires that at
19 Recall that the largest labor market is more than ten times as large as the median labor market (see table 3.1).
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least some workers start to work in a region that is of a different size to the average region in which individual
experience was acquired. Despite the rather low degree of mobility, there presumably is sufficient variation to
test this hypothesis. Corresponding results are reported at the end of the next section. Before this, the next
section discusses the results for the control variables and the impact of the size of the labor market in which
experience was acquired on experience’s value and future productivity as reflected in wages.
Table 3.3: The size of labor market in which experience was acquired and in which it is used
Size of labor market in which experience is used
Share in % in thousand employees
≤ 125 125-250 250-500 500-1000 > 1000 Total
Average size of ≤ 125 11.88 3.74 1.34 0.57 1.14 18.68
labor market in which 125-250 3.07 16.91 3.92 1.37 2.09 27.35
a worker acquired 250-500 1.72 3.53 16.94 3.00 2.70 27.89
experience in 500-1000 0.79 1.61 1.86 8.72 5.42 18.39
thousand employees > 1000 0.37 0.42 0.25 0.21 6.45 7.69
Total 17.82 26.20 24.31 13.88 17.80 100.00
N=525,265.
Note: The average size of the labor market in which a worker acquired experience denotes the size of the different labor markets where
the worker acquired experience weighted by the length of employment in the respective labor market.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Control variables
Table 3.4 summarizes the regression results for the control variables that I use in my analysis. Column 1 refers
to ordinary least squares estimation (OLS). Since the available information on educational degrees are only
imperfect measures of skills, OLS results are likely biased. To address that workers might sort on unobserved
abilities into large labor markets, I include individual fixed effects (FE, specification (2)) as introduced by
Glaeser and Maré (2001). This leads to a reduction of my sample, since 188,979 observations refer to work-
ers, for whom I only observe one new employment relationship between 2005 and 2011. The fixed effects
estimation is therefore based on 336,286 observations for 126,862 employees.
The comparison of OLS and FE results shows that the OLS estimates are in most cases biased upwards. How-
ever, the sign of the estimated coefficients is in both models almost always the same and as expected. The
larger the highest educational degree of a worker, the larger is the wage at the beginning of the considered
new employment relationship. For example, workers with a university degree receive a 26 percent (e0.233−1)
higher wage than workers with a secondary/intermediate school leaving certificate and a completed vocational
training.
Since the wage rate that I use as a dependent variable refers to the average wage rate that is paid until Decem-
ber 31 of the year in which the employment relationship starts (see appendix 3.B), I include the length of the
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considered spell of employment, measured in months. It confirms that tenure affects the wage rate positively,
the monthly increase amounts to 0.8 percent.
Table 3.4: Results for control variables
Dependent variable: logarithmic wages in new employment relationships
OLS FE
(1) (2)
Education:
Secondary / intermediate school leaving certificate
. . . without completed vocational training −0.131∗∗∗ (0.014) −0.023 (0.027)
. . . with completed vocational training Reference
Upper secondary school leaving certificate
. . . without completed vocational training −0.019 (0.015) −0.084∗∗∗ (0.029)
. . . with completed vocational training 0.095∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.012∗∗ (0.005)
Completion of a university of applied sciences 0.246∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.167∗∗∗ (0.016)
College / university degree 0.373∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.233∗∗∗ (0.016)
Female worker −0.163∗∗∗ (0.001)
Tenure 0.012∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.008∗∗∗ (0.002)
ln(Number of previous employers) −0.015∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.002)
Length of non-employment
0-28 days (job-to-job transition) Reference
28-92 days −0.053∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.030∗∗∗ (0.002)
93 days - 1 year −0.073∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.034∗∗∗ (0.002)
> 1 year −0.088∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.043∗∗∗ (0.002)
Pre-employment status
Not registered as job seeker Reference
Unemployed and registered as a job seeker −0.063∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.025∗∗∗ (0.002)
Not unemployed, but registered as a job seeker −0.071∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.026∗∗∗ (0.002)
Participation in measures of active labor market policy −0.024∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.012∗∗∗ (0.002)
Public assistance benefits
No benefit Reference
Unemployment benefit (ALG I) 0.012∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.008∗∗∗ (0.002)
Unemployment assistance (ALG II, ALHI) −0.030∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.001 (0.002)
ln(Number of workers within the establishment) 0.033∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.017∗∗∗ (0.000)
Share of high-skilled workers in establishment 0.173∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.057∗∗∗ (0.004)
Share of low-skilled workers in establishment −0.059∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.025∗∗∗ (0.003)
Share of middle aged workers in establishment 0.131∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.076∗∗∗ (0.003)
Share of older workers in establishment 0.099∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.072∗∗∗ (0.004)
ln(Employment share of the industry within the region) 0.008∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
ln((Herfindahl index based on local industry shares)−1) −0.003 (0.009) −0.020 (0.014)
Share of high-skilled workers in local industry 0.160∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.086∗∗∗ (0.012)
Share of low-skilled workers in local industry −0.022∗∗∗ (0.009) −0.008 (0.011)
ln(Local unemployment rate among high-skilled labor) −0.002 (0.006) −0.083∗∗∗ (0.010)
ln(Local unemployment rate among skilled labor) 0.011∗ (0.006) −0.023∗∗ (0.009)
ln(Local unemployment rate among low-skilled labor) 0.033∗∗∗ (0.007) −0.013 (0.012)
Constant 3.702∗∗∗ (0.035) 3.684∗∗∗ (0.052)
Observations 525,265 336,286
OLS: R2, FE: within R2 0.616 0.183
Worker fixed effects No Yes
Note: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses which are clustered by worker. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and
10 percent level. All models include industry, occupation, and region-year fixed effects as well as total work experience and the pivotal
variable ∑t−1τ=1 I(Oi,τ = 1)× zr(i,τ),τ , see equation (3.6) and column (1) and (2) of table 3.6.
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As results by Yankow (2006) suggest, dynamic agglomeration economies are based not only on learning effects,
but also on a higher quantity of matches between workers and firms. Therefore, I include the number of previous
employers as control variable, meaning the number of different establishments a worker was working in until
the considered new spell of employment starts. If mobility between establishments enhances the quality of
matches, the number of previous employers has a positive impact on wages. The empirical results confirm this
hypothesis. I do find the expected positive impact when controlling for unobserved individual characteristics.
The corresponding elasticity amounts to about 0.06.
With respect to the pre-employment status of a worker, the results show that the longer the period of non-
employment before the considered new spell of employment, the lower is the corresponding wage. Non-
employment of more than one year results in a wage loss of about four percent. Following Mincer and Ofek
(1982), a reasonable explanation is that non-employment accelerates the depreciation of human capital. Since
I assume in the learning function given by equation (3.7) that the work experience depreciates at a constant
rate irrespective of a worker’s employment status, it is worth noting that Mincer and Ofek (1982) also provide
evidence that non-employment only has a temporary negative effect on individual’s human capital, meaning
that eroded human capital is restored after an individual returns to work.
In addition, the estimation results indicate that a worker receives a 2.5 percent lower wage if he or she was
registered by the Federal Employment Agency as a job seeker before the considered transition to employment
than if he or she was not. This points to a selection effect. If workers have good labor market expectations
they register relatively seldom as a job seeker. A similar explanation likely holds for the negative effect of
participation in measures of active labor market policies. Furthermore, workers who received unemployment
benefit (ALG I) before the considered transition to employment have a 0.8 percent higher productivity as
reflected in wage than workers who received no public assistant benefit or unemployment assistance. Again,
this likely is related to proximity to the labor market. Unemployment benefit in Germany is only paid within
the first year after the end of an employment spell of at least one year (with exceptions). Thereafter, either no
public assistant benefit or unemployment assistance is paid, depending on the wealth of the household.
In order to address heterogeneity in firm productivity, I include establishment size and information on the firm’s
workforce composition with respect to the skill level and the age of the workers. Furthermore, time-invariant
heterogeneity across firms belonging to different industries is captured by industry fixed effects. The results
confirm that large firms and firms with a more skilled labor workforce are more productive than others and pay
higher wages. Doubling an establishment workforce comes along with an about one percent higher productivity
and a ten percentage point increase in the share of high-skilled workers with a 0.6 percent higher productivity.
The age structure of a firm’s workforce is correlated with individual productivity as well. A shift from younger
towards middle aged or older workers comes along with higher wages. A reasonable explanation for this are
complementarities between differently aged workers. More than 50 percent of the analyzed wages refer to
young workers. Therefore, the positive coefficients may be explained by a high productivity of young workers
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if their share is low. This interpretation is inline with results obtained by, e.g., Garloff and Roth (2016). They
show that productivity of young workers is higher, the lower their share is in the local workforce.20
The agglomeration economies literature points out that the local industry structure also determines productivity.
As for example formally shown by Duranton and Puga (2004), localization economies generate advantages to
urban specialization if agglomeration causes congestion costs. Therefore, I control for localization economies
by using the local industry share. To address that industrial diversity might also be beneficial due to urbaniza-
tion externalities as suggested by Jacobs (1969) and formally shown by Duranton and Puga (2001), I follow
Combes et al. (2004) and consider the inverse of a Herfindahl index based on the industry shares within local
employment. If all industries have an equal share in the local industry, the inverse of a Herfindahl index cor-
responds to the number of locally operating industries. When industries have unequal shares, it indicates the
‘equivalent’ number of industries, i.e., the number of industries that would result in the same degree of indus-
trial concentration, given equal industry shares.21 The results of the fixed effect model suggest that neither the
share of the own industry nor the diversity of the industry structure in the local labor market affects individual
productivity.
As discussed in the literature review, another strand of literature focuses on the impact of the amount of local-
ized human capital on wages referring to human capital externalities (see, e.g., Moretti, 2004a; Ciccone/Peri,
2006). Parts of these effects are captured by the region fixed effects included in the model. In addition, I
also consider the industry specific regional share of high and low-skilled labor in my analysis. The empirical
results point to a positive effect of the local industry specific share of high-skilled labor. A ten percentage
points increase in this share is associated with a 0.9 percent higher productivity. However, for the interpre-
tation of this contemporaneous effect it is important to recall that only the composite of an externality effect
and a substitution effect is identified. To identify learning benefits, which also might depend on human capital
externalities, this paper does not focus on the analysis of contemporaneous effects, but on benefits of having
previously worked in an urbanized labor market with a large number of workers and a high share of high-skilled
labor. The corresponding results are discussed in the next sub-section.
Finally, I control for skill-specific unemployment rates to address that the literature on the wage curve provides
robust empirical evidence of a negative relationship between wages and unemployment (e.g., Blanchflower/-
Oswald, 1990). I do obtain negative elasticities, although the coefficient of the regional unemployment rate
among low skilled labor is not statistically different from zero.
3.5.2 Main result - The benefit of acquiring experience in large labor markets
Table 3.5 summarizes results that I obtain adopting the empirical strategy suggested by De la Roca and Puga
(2016) to analyze dynamic agglomeration benefits that is described by equation (3.3). In addition to the vari-
20 I also estimate specifications without firm variables as they might cause a simultaneity bias in the estimations (see discussion by
Combes/Gobillon, 2015). The results with regard to my pivotal explanatory variables change only marginally. The results are available
from the author upon request.
21 As suggested by Combes and Gobillon (2015), I remove the own industry from the computation of the index which eases interpretation
since the share of the own industry within the local economy already measures local specialization.
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ables reported in table 3.5 and the control variables reported in table 3.4, all models contain industry, occupa-
tion, and region-year fixed effects. As with De la Roca and Puga (2016) for Spain and Matano and Naticchioni
(2016) for Italy, I focus on the benefit of acquiring experience in Germany’s largest local labor markets: Berlin,
Hamburg and Munich.22 I also include the amount of overall experience in the analysis so that the estimated
effect of experience acquired in Berlin, Hamburg or Munich refers to the difference in the value of experience
acquired there and experience acquired elsewhere in Germany.
Table 3.5: The value of labor market specific work experience
Dependent variable: logarithmic wages in new employment relationships
(1) (2) (3)
Experience Berlin / Hamburg / Munich 0.003∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience Berlin / Hamburg / Munich × experience † −0.005∗∗∗
(0.000)
Experience 0.016∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
(Experience)2 −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
Experience Berlin / Hamburg / Munich, now elsewhere † 0.060∗∗∗ 0.007 0.020
(0.005) (0.006) (0.016)
Experience Berlin / Hamburg / Munich × experience, now elsewhere † 0.001
(0.001)
Experience outside Berlin / Hamburg / Munich , now in 3 largest 0.007∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Experience outside Berlin / Hamburg / Munich × experience, now in 3 largest † −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
New employment relationships 525,265 336,286 336,286
OLS: R2, FE: within R2 0.613 0.180 0.191
Worker fixed effects No Yes Yes
† Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 10.
Note: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses which are clustered by worker. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and
10 percent level. Work experience measured on a daily bases and expressed in years. All models include control variables as well as
year, industry, occupation, and region fixed effects (see table 3.4).
Similar to De la Roca and Puga (2016) as well as to Matano and Naticchioni (2016), I find that one year of
experience acquired in the largest German local labor markets has a significantly higher value than experience
acquired in the rest of the country. The inclusion of individual fixed effects in specification (2) let the value
of experience increase, indicating a negative correlation of unobserved abilities and work experience.23 The
magnitude of the agglomeration benefit is discussed below. In order to test whether the value of experience
depends on where it is used, I consider similar to De la Roca and Puga (2016) interaction effects between
the experience variables and an indicator for moving to the respective other group of labor markets. The
corresponding results of the fixed effects model in column (2) suggest that the value of experience acquired in
22 The local labor market regions of Berlin, Hamburg and Munich are considered as one group. I also estimated a specification where
I distinguish experience acquired in the three labor markets. When controlling for unobservable abilities of the workers by means of
individual fixed effects, I found no significant differences between the value of experience acquired in the three largest German cities.
23 This effect also shows up in the results reported by De la Roca and Puga (2016: table 1)
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the largest labor markets does not change when transferring it to smaller labor markets. The value of experience
acquired outside the large labor markets increases slightly if it is used in Berlin, Hamburg or Munich.
Following De la Roca and Puga (2016), specification (3) additionally contains the square of experience to let
the marginal value of experience decay with more experience. Furthermore, interaction effects of experience
acquired in the largest labor markets and overall experience are included. They allow for heterogeneous ef-
fects for less and more experienced workers (De la Roca/Puga, 2016). Qualitatively, I obtain the same results
as De la Roca and Puga (2016): (i) Experience acquired in the largest local labor markets has a significantly
higher value than experience acquired elsewhere. (ii) The marginal gain of working in one of the largest labor
markets is higher for individuals with less work experience than for more experienced workers. This is par-
ticularly true for workers who previously worked elsewhere in the country. A reasonable explanation is that,
ceteris paribus, the latter workers so far accumulated less human capital than individuals who worked in the
largest labor markets. (iii) The value of experience acquired in the largest labor markets is highly portable
to smaller labor markets which strongly supports the hypothesis that learning externalities play an important
role. (iv) Experience acquired in the rest of the country has a higher value if it is used in the largest local labor
markets than in the rest of the country. However, the location where experience was acquired has a stronger
impact on its value than the location where it is used. The first year of experience acquired in Berlin, Hamburg
or Munich increases wages by about 1.3 percent (e0.01338−0.00047−1) relative to having worked elsewhere and
independently of the new job location. In comparison, the value of the first year of experience acquired outside
the largest local labor markets increases by less than 0.7 percent if the worker moves to Berlin, Hamburg or
Munich. Qualitatively, the results are the same as obtained by De la Roca and Puga (2016) for Spain. Quanti-
tatively, the identified agglomeration benefit for the largest German agglomerations is somewhat smaller than
the dynamic agglomeration gains obtained by De la Roca and Puga (2016) for Madrid and Barcelona and by
Matano and Naticchioni (2016) for Rome and Milan. Their results indicate that the value of the first year work
experience acquired in the largest cities of the considered country has, respectively, a three percent and two
percent higher value than the first year acquired elsewhere.24
The results reported in table 3.5 and by other scholars raise the question of how the value of experience exactly
depends on the size of the local labor market in which it was acquired. To provide corresponding insights, I
estimate the parameters of equations (3.6) and (3.12). The estimates of the pivotal parameters are summarized
in table 3.6. Again, I observe that the value of experience is biased downwards if I do not control for unobserved
characteristics by means of individual fixed effects.
Column (1) and (2) of table 3.6 contain results for equation (3.6) referring to the simplified learning function
given by equation (3.4). It is assumed that the marginal value of experience does not depend on the amount
of previous work experience and already accumulated human capital. The findings support the hypothesis that
labor market size fosters the individual accumulation of knowledge. Labor market size positively impacts on
the value of the acquired experience which reflects in higher future wages. According to the specification with
24 The estimated earnings premia are only to a limited extent comparable across countries as the largest local labor markets within the
different countries and also the respective reference, i.e., the country specific ‘average’ local labor market differ in size.
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individual fixed effects, the elasticity of wage with respect to the size of the labor market in which experience
was acquired at one day in the past, denoted by δ , amounts to 0.116×10−4. This effect may also be interpreted
as the elasticity of the marginal value of work experience with respect to labor market size (see equation (3.4)).
Table 3.6: Estimates of the parameters of the learning function
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δˆ † 0.059∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026)
Zˆ 140.101∗∗∗ 97.489 25.506 90.753
(33.936) (111.521) (22.027) (80.944)
θ † 3.452 4.177
New employment relationships 525,265 336,286 336,286 214,319
OLS: R2, FE: within R2 0.616 0.183 0.197 0.261
Worker fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
† Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 10,000.
Note: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses which are clustered by worker. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and
10 percent level. Zˆ calculated based on delta method and δˆ and γˆ (not reported). Column (1) and (2) refer to the baseline model given by
equation (3.6) which is based on the simplified learning function (equation (3.4)). Column (3) and (4) report results for equation (3.12).
It is based on the augmented learning function (equation (3.7)) . The results in column (3) are obtained using the full sample. The
specification reported in column (4) is restricted to workers who acquired work experience only 1995 or later. All specifications include
control variables as well as industry, occupation, and region-year fixed effects (see table 3.4).
Based on the estimated parameters δˆ and γˆ (not reported), I compute Zˆ, the estimate of the threshold that in-
dicates beyond which labor market size learning externalities arise (see equation (3.4)). The results strongly
suggest that workers accumulate human capital even if they work in the smallest German local labor markets
with a local workforce of about 15,000 employees. The estimated critical value amounts to about 100 employ-
ees.
The results summarized in column (1) and (2) are based on the assumption that human capital does not de-
preciate over time. However, this assumption is too restrictive as indicated by the results reported in column
(3) of table 3.6. They refer to equation (3.12) which is based on the augmented learning function given by
equation (3.7). The significant differences in the parameter estimates between column (2) and (3) as well as the
notable increase in the within R2 confirm that it is important to address that a worker’s human capital acquired at
some point in the past has a lower value the more time passed. This effect is captured in the augmented learning
function by θ . Equation (3.12) which I estimate in order to determine the parameters of the augmented learning
function is highly non-linear in this parameter. Therefore, maximum likelihood estimation is applied in order
to obtain an estimate for θ . Once a value is imposed for θ , a linear fixed-effects estimator can be applied to
estimate the other parameters. Column (3) contains the results that I obtain when θ is set equal to 3.452×10−4
which maximizes the fit of the regression model.25 A θ of 3.452× 10−4 means that the human capital which
was acquired at date t− 365 is weighted by factor 0.882 (= (1− 0.0003452)364). The weight is smaller than
25 The results that are obtained for other values of θ are reported in table 3.C.2. Starting with θ = 1×10−4 (not reported in table 3.C.2),
I gradually increased / decreased θ by 10 percent. I also estimated a specification with θ close to zero. The result corresponds to the
result reported in column (2) of table 3.6 (compare with specification 22 in table 3.C.2).
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unity since the knowledge that was acquired at date t − 365 lost in value since the day of acquirement. In
contrast, the weight of the knowledge that was acquired at day t−1 is unity.
With respect to δ , I now obtain an elasticity of 0.222× 10−4, and Zˆ is still significantly smaller than the
smallest German local labor market. Both estimates are confirmed by the results reported in column (4). The
latter are based on a reduced sample where I restrict the analysis to individuals who acquired experience not
before 1995. This robustness check takes into account that the chosen definition of labor market regions might
be an inappropriate approximation for the shape of local labor markets decades ago which would result in a
measurement error in the pivotal explanatory variable, i.e., the size of the labor markets in which experience
was acquired. However, it does not seem to be a severe problem here as the results reported in column (3) and
(4) are very similar, although a different value of θ minimizes the residual sum of squares. Using the reduced
sample, I obtain the smallest residual sum of squares if I set θ equal to 4.177×10−4 (see table 3.C.3), meaning
that human capital acquired, e.g., at date t−365 is weighted by 0.859. Furthermore, the reduction of the sample
let the fit of the model increase. Now it explains more than one quarter of wage’s within variation.
The nature of dynamic agglomeration economies in general, and learning externalities in particular, is that
benefits of working in large labor markets accumulate over time. Based on the regression results reported in
columns (3) and (4) of table 3.6, figure 3.2 illustrates for different levels of experience the elasticity of wage
with respect to the (cumulated) size of all the labor markets in which previous experience was acquired. The
elasticity is increasing in the level of experience since the benefit of a one percent increase in the size of all
labor markets in which experience was acquired is larger the higher the level of experience is.26 Consider
for example a worker with two years of work experience at date t. The corresponding elasticity is given by
about 0.01, indicating that doubling the size of all labor markets in which the two years of experience were
acquired results in a 0.7 percent higher wage at date t. For a worker with 10 years of work experience the
benefit of having acquired all his or her experience in a one percent larger labor markets is larger. At this level
of experience the elasticity amounts to about 0.045. Hence, doubling the size of all labor markets in which ten
years of experience were acquired results in a productivity increase at date t by about three percent. At a very
high level of experience the elasticity is even larger. The depreciation of accumulated human capital implies
that the dynamic agglomeration gain converges towards an upper bound. If a worker has a sufficiently large
amount of work experience, the size of the labor market in which the first years of experience were acquired has
only a negligible impact on today’s productivity and wage since the human capital acquired at the beginning of
the individual working life is (almost) fully depreciated.
For levels of experience up to ten years, the estimated elasticities based on the reduced sample and the full
sample are virtually the same. For higher levels of experience they slightly differ. At a level of 30 years of
experience the gap between the point estimates amounts to about 0.006. However, the reduced sample only
contains individuals with work experience of at most 16 years. Therefore, it is not clear-cut which specification
leads to the more reliable estimate of the elasticity at a high level of experience. Nevertheless, the results
26 In general, the elasticity of the value of E days of experience with respect to the size of the labor markets in which the experience was
acquired is, according to the results reported in column (3) of table 3.6, given by 0.222×10−4×∑Ek=1(1−3.452×10−4)k−1 (see also
equation (3.10)).
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are still very similar and their overall interpretation is clear: Dynamic agglomeration benefits have a highly
significant impact on individual productivity. Since workers are rather immobile between labor markets of
different size (see table 3.3), the dynamic gains should explain a significant part of regional wage disparities
between urban and non-urban labor markets. Moreover, the identified agglomeration effects should be strongly
related to learning externalities as I control for the number of job changes in the past which is supposed to be a
proxy for dynamic matching.
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Figure 3.2: Magnitude of dynamic agglomeration benefits
Note: The figure illustrates the regression results reported in column (3) and (4) of table 3.6. For different levels of experience the graph
denotes the percentage increase in productivity, given that the local workforce would have been one percent larger in all labor markets
in which previous work experience was acquired. The reduced sample contains only workers who acquired experience in 1995 or later.
The results discussed in the following sub-section provide to some extent further support for the learning hy-
pothesis and help to understand which underlying mechanisms lead to the increasing gains of working in large
labor markets.
3.5.3 The importance of high-skilled labor and the portability of accumulated human capital
Typically, large urbanized labor markets are not only characterized by a large number of workers but also by
an above average share of high-skilled labor. In accordance with the literature on human capital externalities,
presumably the especially skilled workers are the workers one learns from the most. Hence, an important
question is to which extent dynamic agglomeration benefits can be explained by the higher share or larger
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number of high-skilled workers. In order to provide corresponding insights, I consider Zs,τ , the labor market
size in the learning function (see equation (3.4) and (3.7)), in the following to be an aggregate of total regional
employment, emps,τ , and the local share of high-skilled workers,
hskills,τ
emps,τ
, as given by equation (3.13). So
far, Zs,τ was only measured in terms of total regional employment. The regression model that corresponds
to equation (3.13) is given by equation (3.14) where γ˜ refers not only to the (unknown) minimum number of
workers but also to an (unknown) minimum share of high-skilled labor beyond which learning externalities
arise, denoted by emp and hskillemp , respectively: γ˜ =−ρemp ln(emp)−ρhskill ln
(
hskill
emp
)
.27
δ ln(Zs,τ) = ρemp ln(emps,τ)+ρhskill ln
(
hskills,τ
emps,τ
)
(3.13)
In contrast to δ which denotes the total dynamic agglomeration gain, ρemp refers only to the isolated benefit of
acquiring experience in a labor market with a large workforce in terms of total regional employment. It does
not capture the benefit of acquiring experience in a labor market with an above average share of high-skilled
labor. This latter benefit is captured by ρhskill.
wi,t = ui+µr(i,t),y(t)+ γ˜
t−1
∑
τ=1
I(Oi,τ = 1)× (1−θ)t−τ−1+
+ρemp
t−1
∑
τ=1
I(Oi,τ = 1)× ln(empr(i,τ),τ)× (1−θ)t−τ−1+
+ρhskill
t−1
∑
τ=1
I(Oi,τ = 1)× ln
(
hskillr(i,τ),τ
empr(i,τ),τ
)
× (1−θ)t−τ−1+x′i,tβ + εi,t (3.14)
The definition of labor market size given by equation (3.13) enables not only testing whether the size of a local
labor market in terms of total regional employment positively impacts on the individual accumulation of human
capital holding the composition of the local labor force with regard to skills constant and whether local high-
skilled labor is more important for the individual accumulation of human capital than lower skilled labor. These
hypotheses are confirmed if ρˆemp and ρˆhskill, respectively, are significantly larger than zero. But in addition, it
also enables testing whether it is solely the absolute amount of high-skilled labor in a local labor market that
determines the amount of human capital which is acquired by working in the region. Equation (3.13) and,
analogously, equation (3.14) can be rewritten such that total regional employment and the absolute number of
high-skilled labor rather than the share of the latter are simultaneously considered as measures of labor market
size:
δ ln(Zs,τ) = (ρemp−ρhskill) ln(emps,τ)+ρhskill ln(hskills,τ). (3.15)
From equation (3.15) it follows the following: If ρˆemp is not statistically different from ρˆhskill when estimating
27 I also estimated specifications where I assumed that ln(Zs,τ ) and thereby wi,t is linear in the share of high-skilled labor which is
typically assumed in the literature on human capital externalities (see, e.g., Moretti, 2004a; Heuermann, 2011). Qualitatively, I obtain
the same results as discussed below. Furthermore, those results with respect to ρˆemp are statistically not significantly different from the
corresponding results discussed below. The residual sum of squares differs only marginally as well.
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equation (3.14), the estimation results indicate that, holding the absolute number of high-skilled workers in a
local labor market constant, a change in total regional employment, which has by construction to be caused by
a change in the local employment of non-high-skilled workers, does not affect the amount of acquired human
capital as reflected in future wages. This would imply that solely the absolute amount of local high-skilled
labor is relevant for the analyzed dynamic productivity gains.28
The results that are obtained when estimating equation (3.14) are summarized in Table 3.7. They refer to
the augmented learning function (equation (3.7)) with Zs,τ being an aggregate measure as described by equa-
tion (3.13).29 As discussed in the literature review, some authors stress the importance to distinguish between
productivity effects that are based on human capital externalities and those based on the imperfect substitution
of workers belonging to different skill groups. However, these concerns refer to the interpretation of con-
temporaneous effects of a local employment’s skill structure. I control for these contemporaneous effects by
including region-year fixed effects as well as the local industry specific share of high- and low-skilled labor (see
table 3.4). The results reported in table 3.7 refer to benefits of having previously worked in local labor markets
with a high share of high-skilled workers. In contrast to contemporaneous effects, the gains discussed below
should therefore only be based on external effects.
Table 3.7: Estimates of the parameters of the learning function distinguishing
the impact of total regional employment and the share of high-skilled labor
(1) (2)
ρˆemp † 0.228∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.038)
ρˆhskill † −0.020 0.244∗∗
(0.068) (0.096)
ˆ˜γ † −0.841∗ 0.377
(0.485) (0.648)
θ † 3.452 4.177
New employment relationships 336,286 214,319
within R2 0.197 0.261
† Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 10,000.
Note: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses which are clustered by worker. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and
10 percent level. Both columns summarize estimates of the parameters of the augmented learning function (equation (3.7)) with labor
market size Zs,τ being an aggregate of total regional employment and the local share of high-skilled labor as given by equation (3.13).
The results reported in column (1) are obtained using the full sample, the results reported in column (2) using a reduced sample which
does not contain new employment relationships of workers who acquired experience before 1995. All models include control variables
as well as worker, industry, occupation, and region-year fixed effects (see table 3.4).
The results reported in column (1) are obtained using the full sample of new employment relationships. The
results reported in column (2) are based on the reduced sample which does not contain new employment rela-
28 Whether solely the absolute amount of high-skilled labor matters, could alternatively be tested by measuring local labor market size
in terms of the absolute number of high-skilled workers and the absolute number of the other (non-high-skilled) workers: δ ln(Zs,τ ) =
ωnhskill ln(emps,τ−hskills,τ )+ωhskill ln(hskills,τ ). In order to test, whether the local amount of high-skilled labor is of more importance
for the analyzed productivity gains than the local amount of non-high-skilled labor, it then has to be tested whether ωhskill is statistically
larger than ωnhskill after estimating these elasticities.
29 The reported results are obtained setting θ equal to 3.452× 10−4 and 4.177× 10−4, respectively. Results for other values of θ are
summarized in table 3.C.4 and table 3.C.5.
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tionships of workers who acquired experience before 1995. The regression results are ambiguous. The results
in column (1) suggest, that it is the amount of total regional employment in the labor markets in which a worker
acquired work experience that determines his or her future productivity. The composition of the local labor
force with respect to the skill level seems not to have an important effect. The null hypothesis that ρhskill is zero
cannot be rejected at conventional levels. The sign of the estimated parameter is even negative. This surprises
as one presumably learns more from high- than from low-skilled labor. The latter view, contrasting with the
results in column (1), is, however, supported by the results reported in column (2). Using the restricted sample,
a statistically and economically highly significant effect is identified not only for the labor market size in terms
of total regional employment, but also for the local share of high-skilled labor. Hence, these results indicate
that, holding total employment in the labor markets in which work experience was acquired constant, wages
today are higher the larger the share of high-skilled workers in the local labor markets were. Vice versa, holding
the composition of a local labor force with respect to skills constant, an increasing size of the local labor force
has a positive effect on future productivity as well.
Comparing the estimated elasticities ρˆskill and ρˆemp shows that they are of comparable magnitude. Moreover, the
hypotheses that the elasticities are equal to each other cannot be rejected at conventional levels (p-value=0.526).
Therefore, the regression results reported in column (2) furthermore suggest that it is solely the absolute amount
of high-skilled labor in the local labor markets in which experience was acquired previously that determines
the productivity of a worker. For an increase in the total number of workers which is caused by an increasing
number of non-high-skilled workers, meaning that the number of high-skilled workers remains constant, a
statistically significant effect on future wages cannot be identified since ρˆemp is not statistically different from
ρˆskill (see equation (3.15)).
Based on the results reported in table 3.7, it is not possible to compute the thresholds emp and hskillemp explic-
itly. However, for each considered region-year-combination the term −ρˆemp ln(empr,t)− ρˆhskill ln
(
hskillr,t
empr,t
)
is
smaller than ˆ˜γ . It again indicates that working in any of the local labor markets in Germany has a positive
impact on the future productivity of an individual worker, even though it remains ambiguous whether the bene-
fit increases in the size of the entire local labor force or only in the local (absolute) amount of high-skilled labor.
Finally, I let the parameters of the learning function vary depending on the labor market in which the accumu-
lated human capital is used. As in the baseline specifications, I use the local labor market size in terms of total
regional employment in order to quantify dynamic agglomeration benefits. I do not distinguish whether the gain
from acquiring experience in a large labor market is related to the large number of workers or the above average
share of high-skilled labor. In contrast, I take into account that the productivity increase which comes from the
acquired work experience might not be the same in all regions. More precisely, I estimate equation (3.12) again,
but now I let the parameters of the learning function vary depending on whether the new employer is located
in a small, medium, or large labor market. As large local labor markets I consider those with a local workforce
of more than 750,000 employees: Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Stuttgart, Cologne. Labor
markets with less than 100,000 employees are considered as small labor markets, i.e., 43 percent of all German
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local labor market regions. The remaining labor markets represent the reference group.30 Table 3.8 on page 64
captures the corresponding estimates for the pivotal parameters. The results reported in column (1) are obtained
based on the full sample, the results in column (2) based on the reduced sample.31 The details of the result are
discussed at the end of this sub-section.
Overall, both specifications indicate that the value of experience varies little between the considered groups of
labor markets. This supports the hypothesis that the identified dynamic agglomeration benefits are related to
learning externalities. A worker who previously worked in a large labor market is in comparison to a worker
who previously worked somewhere else, ceteris paribus, more productive, independently of where they make
use of their work experience. Similar as with De la Roca and Puga (2016: figure 3), figure 3.3 illustrates this
exemplarily. The reference is a worker who acquired 30 years of work experience in a labor market with a size
of 100,000 employees. The solid black line refers to a worker who acquired 30 years of experience in a labor
market with a size of 1,000,000 employees. In line with the idea of dynamic agglomeration economies the gap
in individual productivity significantly increases over time. However, marginal benefits are decreasing. This
is caused by the depreciation of previously accumulated human capital. The worker in the larger labor market
accumulated in the past more human capital which is why he or she experiences an in absolute terms larger
gross loss in the value of previously accumulated human capital than the worker in the smaller labor market
(see equation 3.7). After 30 years the difference in productivity amounts to about 17 percent.
The dashed lines indicate what happens if a worker migrates after ten years from the larger to the smaller labor
market or vice versa. The immediate changes in productivity as reflected in wage are, especially in comparison
to the marked differences in the level of productivity, small. However, in the years after migration productivity
adjusts. In the larger labor market the worker who initially worked in the smaller labor market catches-up. The
intuition behind this development is straightforward. Due to the depreciation of accumulated human capital, it
becomes less important in which local labor market experience was acquired at the beginning of the individual
career the more time passes (compare equation 3.7). 20 years after migrating to the respective other regional
labor market, the productivity differential relative to the worker who always stayed in the destination amounts
only to about one percent.
30 I also estimated specification where I require large labor markets to have a local workforce of at least 500,000 employees and at least
1,000,000 employees, respectively. The obtained results are very similar to those reported in table 3.8 and available upon request.
31 Results that I obtain setting θ to other values than those reported in table 3.8 can be found in tables 3.C.6 and 3.C.7, respectively.
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Always large labor market with 1,000,000 employees
First 10 years labor market with 1,000,000 employees, thereafter labor market with 100,000 employees
First 10 years labor market with 100,000 employees, thereafter labor market with 1,000,000 employees
Figure 3.3: Labor productivity after migration
Note: Following De la Roca and Puga (2016: figure 3), this figure illustrates exemplarily the regression results reported in column (1)
of table 3.8.
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Turning to the parameter estimates reported in table 3.8 shows that the estimates which are obtained based
on new employment relationships in small labor markets are of a comparable magnitude and not statistically
different from those obtained based on wages paid in medium size labor markets. With regard to large labor
markets, I obtain an estimate for δ that is about one fifth smaller than the other estimates for δ . Ceteris paribus,
it suggests that wages in large labor markets are slightly less elastic with regard to the size of the labor market
in which previous experience was acquired than in the other labor markets.32 This finding is in accordance with
my results reported in table 3.5. In the three largest German labor markets the difference in the wage of a worker
with one year of experience acquired in Berlin, Hamburg or Munich and the wage of a worker who acquired the
experience somewhere else amounts to about 0.6 percent (= (0.0134−0.0005)− (0.0071−0.0003)). Outside
the three largest labor markets this difference amounts to about 1.3 percent (= 0.0134−0.0005). De la Roca and
Puga (2016) obtain a similar result for Spain. The phenomenon might also be related to learning externalities.
Suppose workers who acquired experience in a large local labor market, lets call them workers of type L, and
workers who acquired the same amount of experience in a medium or small local labor market, workers of type
S, are imperfect substitutes since the accumulated knowledge differs. Then, workers of type L may receive a
higher wage, relative to workers of type S, especially if they use their accumulated knowledge in a smaller labor
market, in which workers of type L are relatively rare (compare table 3.3). In contrast, if both types of workers
use their accumulated human capital in a large labor market, the wage difference presumably is smaller since
there are many workers of type L and few of type S.
When discussing the difference in δˆ , it has to be taken into account that there also exists an opposite effect.
For Zˆ, defined as exp(−γˆ/δˆ ), I obtain a smaller estimate as well when considering wages paid in large labor
markets, although the difference in this parameter is not statistically significant. Ceteris paribus, this suggests
that the value of each unit of experience is slightly higher if experience is used in a large labor market rather
than somewhere else, see equations (3.4) and (3.7). One explanation may refer to a higher quality of matches
between job seekers and vacancies in large than in other labor markets, e.g., due to a larger variety of available
jobs. If a worker accumulated at each day when experience was acquired a small amount of human capital that
he or she can make use of only if the new job is located in a large labor market because of the better match, it
should result in a smaller estimate for Zˆ.
However, it should be stressed here that the differences in δˆ and Zˆ should not be overemphasized. Quanti-
tatively, the differences in the parameter estimates are rather small depending on whether they are estimated
based on wages paid in large, medium, or small labor markets. Furthermore, the effects go in opposite direc-
tions. As illustrated by figure 3.3, there is virtually no jump in the value of experience if a worker leaves a
large labor market to work somewhere else. This implies that the opposite effects outweigh each other.33 This
is in accordance with the results reported in table 3.5 and by De la Roca and Puga (2016) which suggest that
a worker from the largest labor markets of a country does not suffer from a decline in productivity if he or
32 Recall that differences in static regional wage differentials between large, medium, and small labor markets are captured by the region
fixed effects, not by δr(i,t).
33 I also considered a case where a worker acquired experience in a labor market with a size of 750,000 employees and 1,400,000
employees, respectively. In both cases, there is again virtually no jump in the value of experience if the worker migrates to a labor
market with a size of 100,000 employees.
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she uses the accumulated human capital somewhere else. For workers who migrate from a smaller to a larger
labor market there might be a small immediate productivity increase as illustrated by figure 3.3 and reported
in table 3.5 as well as by De la Roca and Puga (2016), maybe due to a better match between job seeker and
vacancy. Nevertheless, in comparison to a worker who already previously worked in the larger labor market
there is a significant gap in individual productivity which presumably is a result of learning externalities in the
larger labor market.
Table 3.8: Estimates of the parameters of the learning function
depending on the size of the labor market in which experience is used
(1) (2)
Now large labor market
∆δˆ † −0.044∗∗∗ −0.037
(0.016) (0.024)
∆Zˆ −41.357 −70.444
(33.423) (72.390)
Now medium size labor market (reference)
δˆ † 0.236∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.028)
Zˆ 45.866 76.967
(37.650) (79.588)
Now small labor market
∆δˆ † −0.025 −0.001
(0.017) (0.026)
∆Zˆ −27.928 18.587
(26.775) (78.715)
θ † 3.452 4.177
New employment relationships 336,286 214,319
within R2 0.195 0.260
† Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 10,000.
Note: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses which are clustered by worker. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5
and 10 percent level. Both columns summarize estimates of the parameters of the augmented learning function (equation (3.7)). Zˆ
calculated based on delta method and δˆ and γˆ (not reported). The parameters are allowed to vary depending on the size of the labor
market in which the accumulated knowledge is used. Labor markets with a total number of at least 750,000 employees are considered
as large labor markets, local labor markets with less than 100,000 employees as small labor markets. ∆ refers to the difference in a
parameter in comparison to the reference group, i.e., medium size labor markets. The results reported in column (1) are obtained using
the full sample, the results reported in column (2) using a reduced sample which does not contain new employment relationships of
workers who acquired experience before 1995. All models including control variables as well as worker, industry, occupation, and
region-year fixed effects (see table 3.4).
Despite the various new insights this paper provides, there are some caveats to bear in mind. Although, I try to
control for the second potential channel of dynamic agglomeration benefits, dynamic matching, by including
the number of previous employers, there is no guarantee that this variable fully captures the effect. Further-
more, I cannot fully rule out that my analysis still suffers from selection effects, even though I control for
various observable and unobservable characteristics of the workers. Imagine, workers have expectations on
their individual learning opportunities in urban labor markets and took them into account when they decided
where to work. This would imply a positive selection because especially those workers would have decided
to acquire experience in a large labor market who expect to learn much. At least part of this selection should
be captured by the individual fixed effects and by the time-variant individual characteristics like educational
Chapter 3: Quantifying the effect of labor market size on learning externalities 65
degree. However, if the expected individual learning opportunities depend on unobserved time-variant individ-
ual characteristics, the estimated benefits of acquiring experience in large local labor markets are likely biased
upwards.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence as to why wages are higher in urban than in non-urban local labor
markets. The focus lies on learning externalities which are discussed to be one mechanism behind dynamic
agglomeration economies. I analyze to which extent wages associated with new employment relationships
depend on the size of local labor markets in which previous work experience was acquired. Based on an
administrative data set capturing detailed information on individual employment biographies, I first show for
Germany, like De la Roca and Puga (2016) for Spain and Matano and Naticchioni (2016) for Italy, that the
experience acquired in the largest local labor markets has a significantly higher impact on future productivity
than experience acquired in the rest of the country, as reflected in higher wages. Thereafter, this study goes a
step further as previous papers in order to obtain more general results. Taking also into account the depreciation
of human capital, it estimates the elasticity of wage with respect to the size of the labor market in which
experience was acquired. In accordance with the idea that dynamic agglomeration benefits accumulate over
time, the elasticity increases with the level of experience. For example, after two years of working, the elasticity
of wage with respect to the size of the labor markets in which experience was acquired amounts to more than
0.01, after ten years to more than 0.04 and after 30 years to about 0.06. The latter, for example, implies that
doubling employment in all local labor markets in which 30 years of experience were acquired results in a
productivity increase of about four percent. Since workers are rather immobile between labor markets that
differ in size, the identified dynamic agglomeration benefit should significantly contribute to wage disparities
between urban and non-urban labor markets.
The identified effect should be strongly related to learning externalities. I control for observable as well as
unobservable characteristics of the worker and the region in which the new employer is located, as well as
for characteristics of the firm and the local industry. I also take into account other channels of agglomeration
economies, inter alia, dynamic matching. Furthermore, my results are also in line with previous findings that
the value of experience is predominately determined by the size of the labor market in which experience was
acquired rather than by the labor market in which it is used. Initially, the productivity of workers as reflected
in wages changes little when they migrate from a large labor market to a small one or vice versa. However, in
the following years productivity adjusts presumably due to the depreciation of the accumulated human capital.
For workers who migrate to a smaller labor market, the benefit of having previously worked in a larger labor
market declines the more time passes. On the contrary, workers who migrate to a larger labor market experience
a strong relative productivity increase in the following years and catch-up to those who always worked in the
larger labor market.
Finally, this paper aims at analyzing as to which characteristic of an urban labor market leads to the increasing
gains of acquiring experience there. More precisely, I distinguish the impact of labor market size on the value
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of acquired experience and future productivity from the impact of the local share of high-skilled labor. Thereby,
I address that it presumably is especially high-skilled labor workers learn from. However, the results are am-
biguous. Some specifications suggest that it is the local labor market size in terms of total regional employment
which determines future productivity and wages. According to these results the local workforce composition
with regard to skills does not affect the value of acquired work experience. In contrast, other specifications in-
dicate that the value of work experience depends only on the number of high-skilled workers in the local labor
market in which the experience was acquired. Due to these contradictory results, further research is needed
to investigate the importance of a local labor force’s skill composition for the growth of a worker’s produc-
tivity over working live. A further interesting question for future research is whether dynamic agglomeration
economies are increasing in labor market size without bound, or whether the benefit decreases beyond some
threshold since, inter alia, urban congestion may hinder the transmission of skills as discussed by, for example,
Duranton and Puga (2004).
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Appendix
3.A The solution of equation (3.9)
The difference equation given by equation (3.9) is a special case of the general first-order difference equation
xt+1 = bt +atxt . Therefore, the solution of equation (3.9) can be obtained based on the solution of the general
difference equation.
General first-order difference equation,
see, e.g., Sydsæter et al. (2008: 394f.):
xt+1 = bt +atxt t = 0,1,2, . . .
Difference equation given by (3.9),
omitting some indices for simplicity:
Qτ+1 =
δ ln
(
Zr(τ)
Z
)
+(1−θ)Qτ if Zr(τ) > Z and Oτ = 1
(1−θ)Qτ else
The first few values are given by:
x1 = b0 +a0x0
x2 = b1 +a1b0 +a1a0x0
x3 = b2 +a2b1 +a2a1b0 +a2a1a0x0
x4 = b3 +a3b2 +a3a2b1 +a3a2a1b0 +a3a2a1a0x0
The first few values are given by:
(per definition, before day 1 no experience was acquired)
Q1 = 0 (see equation (3.8))
Q2 = b˜1
Q3 = b˜2 + a˜2b˜1
Q4 = b˜3 + a˜3b˜2 + a˜3a˜2b˜1
with Q0 = 0, b˜0 = 0, a˜τ = 1−θ ,
b˜τ = I(Oi,τ = 1)×δ max
{
ln
(
Zr(τ)
Z
)
;0
}
The solution is given by,
see Sydsæter et al. (2008: chap. 11.1, eq. 11):
xt =
(
t−1
∏
s=0
as
)
x0 +
t−1
∑
k=0
(
t−1
∏
s=k+1
as
)
bk,
with the product ∏t−1s=0 as of zero terms being 1.
For τ = 2,3,4, . . ., the solution is given by:
Qτ =
τ−1
∑
k=1
(1−θ)τ−k−1× b˜k
=
τ−1
∑
k=1
(1−θ)τ−k−1× I(Oi,k = 1)×δ max
{
ln
(Zr(k)
Z
)
;0
}
.
Proof by mathematical induction:
Q2 = (1−θ)2−1−1× b˜1 = b˜1
Qτ+1 = b˜τ +(1−θ)Qτ
= b˜τ + a˜τ
τ−1
∑
k=1
(1−θ)τ−k−1× b˜k
= b˜τ +
τ−1
∑
k=1
(1−θ)(τ+1)−k−1× b˜k
=
τ
∑
k=1
(1−θ)(τ+1)−k−1× b˜k
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3.B Further information on data
The units of observation in my analysis are new employment relationships within the period between 2005 and
2011. I restrict the analysis to new employment of individuals to whom information on the entire employment
biography is available. As the IEB contains information on employment in West Germany only from 1975
onwards, I exclude all workers who were born before 1960. Reliable and complete information on employment
in East Germany is only available from 1993 onwards. Therefore, I also exclude all workers who presumably
worked in East Germany before reunification, i.e., all workers for whom I do not observe an spell of employ-
ment before 1990 and who were born before 1977. Additionally, I do not consider individuals who worked
before 1993 in a labor market region which today contains parts of former East and West Germany. Further-
more, I restrict the analysis to workers with a German nationality. Since information on the place of birth is
not available, it is the only possibility to exclude immigrants. This is necessary as for this group of individuals
information on the entire previous work experience is not available.
In my analysis, I only consider new spells of employment with a length of at least seven days that refer to
full-time employment subject to social security contributions outside the public sector and the temporary em-
ployment industry. I do not consider apprenticeships, nor are new employment relationships that start simulta-
neously with another employment relationship or with a measure of active labor market policy. In the latter case
I cannot ensure that this employment is not publicly subsidized. Furthermore, new employment relationships
with wages below two times the limit for marginal employment as well as recalls, i.e., cases in which a worker
starts to work in an establishment in which he or she worked at least once during the previous 28 days, are
not considered. If a worker is already employed at the starting date of the new employment relationship by
another establishment, I consider the new employment relationship only if the previous spell of employment
ends within 7 days. Furthermore, I exclude a new employment relationship if it is the first spell of employment
in a person’s life.
The dependent variable in my analysis is the wage of a new employment relationship. The first employment
spell in the IEB of a new employment relationship ends, at the latest, by December 31 of the year in which the
new employment relationship starts. By dividing total reported earnings by the length of the spell, daily wages
are obtained which I use as the dependent variable. Information on actual working days or contract hours is
not available. Firms report earnings only up to the upper limit for social security contributions. Therefore, the
wage information in the IEB is right censored. I follow Reichelt (2015) and apply an interval regression, a
generalization of tobit regression, to predict the wages above the threshold (about 6% of the observations). See
Reichelt (2015) for a detailed description on how interval regression is applied to impute right-censored wages.
For the imputation I use information on sex, age, nationality, educational level, industry and the region in which
the establishment is located. The results of my regression analysis do not change when I use the reported wages
as dependent variable instead of the imputed wages. Table 3.B.1 provides information on the definition of all
variables used in this analysis.
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Table 3.B.1: Variables - definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
Gross daily wage Daily wages are calculated by dividing the reported total earning from
employment spell by the length of the spell. Wages above the upper limit
for social security contributions are imputed (see Appendix 3.A).
IEB
Size of local la-
bor market in
which experience
was acquired
Size of regional labor market regions, defined according to Kosfeld and
Werner (2012), in which work experience was acquired until the consid-
ered new employment relationship. Measured in terms of employment
subject to social security contributions. The share of high-skilled labor
refers to workers with an university degree.
IEB
Work experience Length of previous employment spells measured on a daily basis.
Marginal employment is not considered, nor are employment spells that
refer to measures of active labor market policies. I also compute the work
experience that was acquired in the largest German labor market regions,
i.e., Berlin, Hamburg and Munich.
IEB
Tenure The length of an employment spell in month that refers to a new employ-
ment relationship. The spell ends at the latest by December 31 of the year
in which the new employment relationship starts.
IEB
ln(Number of
employers)
The number of unique establishment identifiers until the considered new
employment relationship, by person.
IEB
Educational level
of the worker
A categorial variable that combines information on the highest school
leaving certificate, completed vocational training and university degree.
For some spells of employment this information is missing. If so, I use
the information from previous employment spells following Fitzenberger
et al. (2005).
IEB
Gender Dummy variable distinguishing male and female workers. IEB
Length of non-
employment
The number of days between the beginning of the new employment rela-
tionship and the end of the previous employment spell.
IEB
Pre-employment
status
Dummy variables referring to the 28 days before the considered transition
to employment
IEB
- unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld I)
- unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosengeld II / Arbeitslosenhilfe).
- unemployed and registered as a job seeker
- not unemployed, but registered as a job seeker
- participating in active labor market policy programms.
Firm characteris-
tics
Number of employees, share of workers with a university degree, share
of workers with no completed vocational training/no university degree,
share of workers younger than 30 years old, share of workers 50 years
old or older. The information refers to the last reference date (June 30)
before the considered transition.
Establishment
History Panel
(BHP)
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Table 3.B.1 continued
Variable Definition Source
Industry share Logarithm of the employment share of the industry (2-digit level: 88
industries) in total regional employment.∗
Employment
statistics of the
Federal Employ-
ment Agency
(FEA)
Industrial diver-
sity
Logarithm of the inverse Herfindahl index based on the employment
shares of the different industries in total regional employment. The own
industry is excluded when the inverse Herfindahl index is calculated.∗
FEA
Human capital
within the local
industry
Share of workers with a university degree in total employment and share
of workers without completed vocational training/university degree in the
same industry and regional labor market.∗
FEA
Skill-specific un-
employment rate
of the regional
labor market
The share of persons registered as unemployed in the number of per-
sons who are registered as unemployed or employed in the region. I dis-
tinguish three groups: persons with a university degree, persons with a
completed vocational training, and persons without completed vocational
training/university degree.∗
(Un-)employment
statistics of the
Federal Employ-
ment Agency
Industry fixed
effects
Fixed effects for 88 distinct industries (2-digit level according to the clas-
sification from 2008). In 2008, there was a change in the industry clas-
sification. If an establishment is observed before and after 2008, I assign
the spells of employment from 2005–2007 to the industry that the firm
reports in 2008 (or later). If an establishment identifier shows up only for
2005–2007, I use a correlation matrix between the old and new industry
classification as described by Eberle et al. (2011).
IEB
Occupation fixed
effects
Fixed effects for 335 distinct occupations. IEB
Region-year fixed
effects
Time varying fixed effects for the location of the establishment in which
a person starts to work. The location refers to one of 141 functional labor
markets which are defined according to commuting intensity between
NUTS-3-regions (see Kosfeld/Werner, 2012).
IEB
∗ The information refers to June 30th of the previous year.
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3.C Further results
Table 3.C.1: Summary statistics
Only workers with at least
Entire sample two new employment relationships
mean sd min max mean sd min max
ln(imputed gross daily wage) 4.102 0.465 3.267 7.192 4.102 0.455 3.267 7.192
Total work experience in days 3423.791 2741.222 1.000 13403.001 3475.382 2644.871 1.000 13219.999
Experience acquired in Berlin / Hamburg / Munich in days 371.170 1216.804 0.000 13023.000 380.287 1199.576 0.000 13023.000
Size of local labor market in which experience was acquired§
ln(Number of employees) 12.510 0.848 9.512 14.187 12.493 0.841 9.512 14.187
Share of high-skilled employment 0.100 0.040 0.011 0.383 0.099 0.039 0.013 0.325
Tenure in month 5.990 3.585 0.033 12.000 5.784 3.540 0.033 12.000
ln(Number of previous employers)† 1.191 0.784 0.000 4.331 1.325 0.758 0.000 4.331
Length of non-employment
0-28 days (job-to-job transition) 0.552 0.497 0.000 1.000 0.561 0.496 0.000 1.000
29-92 days 0.142 0.350 0.000 1.000 0.161 0.368 0.000 1.000
93 days - 1 year 0.156 0.363 0.000 1.000 0.169 0.375 0.000 1.000
> 1 year 0.150 0.357 0.000 1.000 0.108 0.311 0.000 1.000
Pre-employment status
Not registered as job seeker 0.584 0.493 0.000 1.000 0.552 0.497 0.000 1.000
Unemployed and registered as a job seeker 0.310 0.463 0.000 1.000 0.339 0.473 0.000 1.000
Not unemployed, but registered as a job seeker 0.106 0.307 0.000 1.000 0.109 0.312 0.000 1.000
Participation in measures of active labor market policy 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000 0.061 0.240 0.000 1.000
Public assistance benefits
No benefits 0.691 0.462 0.000 1.000 0.664 0.472 0.000 1.000
Unemployment benefit (ALG I) 0.235 0.424 0.000 1.000 0.268 0.443 0.000 1.000
Unemployment assistance (ALG II, ALHI) 0.074 0.261 0.000 1.000 0.068 0.252 0.000 1.000
Education:
Secondary/intermediate school leaving certificate
. . . without completed vocational training 0.083 0.276 0.000 1.000 0.071 0.257 0.000 1.000
. . . with completed vocational training 0.671 0.470 0.000 1.000 0.697 0.459 0.000 1.000
Upper secondary school leaving certificate
. . . without completed vocational training 0.020 0.140 0.000 1.000 0.015 0.123 0.000 1.000
. . . with completed vocational training 0.101 0.302 0.000 1.000 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000
Completion of a university of applied sciences 0.046 0.209 0.000 1.000 0.045 0.208 0.000 1.000
College/ university degree 0.079 0.270 0.000 1.000 0.072 0.258 0.000 1.000
Female worker 0.362 0.481 0.000 1.000 0.329 0.470 0.000 1.000
ln(Number of workers within the establishment) 3.951 1.936 0.000 ∗ 3.830 1.883 0.000 ∗
Share high-skilled workers in establishment 0.112 0.200 0.000 1.000 0.103 0.193 0.000 1.000
Share low-skilled workers in establishment 0.152 0.204 0.000 1.000 0.155 0.209 0.000 1.000
Share of middle aged workers in establishment 0.523 0.176 -0.000 1.000 0.522 0.179 -0.000 1.000
Share of older workers in establishment 0.205 0.151 0.000 1.000 0.202 0.151 0.000 1.000
ln(Employment share of the industry within the region) -3.528 1.053 -12.732 -0.855 -3.528 1.045 -12.732 -0.855
ln((Herfindahl index based on local industry shares)−1) 3.036 0.266 1.444 3.551 3.027 0.266 1.444 3.551
Share high-skilled workers in local industry 0.105 0.108 0.000 0.855 0.099 0.104 0.000 0.855
Share low-skilled workers in local industry 0.190 0.088 0.000 1.000 0.193 0.089 0.000 1.000
ln(Local unemployment rate among high-skilled labor)‡ 1.855 0.420 0.294 2.838 1.855 0.419 0.294 2.838
ln(Local unemployment rate among skilled labor)‡ 2.254 0.429 0.981 3.484 2.259 0.433 0.981 3.484
ln(Local unemployment rate among low-skilled labor)‡ 3.403 0.375 2.245 4.293 3.402 0.375 2.245 4.293
Observations 525,265 336,286
§ Weighted average size of the labor markets where an individual acquired experience before the considered new employment relation-
ship starts, computed on individual level and weighted by the respective length of the previous spell of employment. † For less than
1 percent of the observations the number of previous employers exceeds 18, for less than 10 percent 9 previous employers. ‡ In the
empirical analysis this variable is set to zero if the considered worker belongs to another skill level. Therefore, the summary statistics
refer only to transitions of, respectively, high-, medium- and low-skilled workers. ∗ Due to data protection guidelines not reported. For
less than 1 percent of the observations firm size exceeds about 7500 employees.
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Table 3.C.2: Estimates of the parameters of the learning function based on different values for θ and full sample,
labor market size in terms of total regional employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
θ † 50.000 10.000 5.000 4.595 4.177 3.797 3.452 3.138 2.996 2.853 2.853
δˆ † 0.802∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.026) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
γˆ † −3.567∗∗∗ −1.080∗∗∗ −0.766∗∗∗ −0.751∗∗∗ −0.737∗∗∗ −0.727∗∗∗ -0.718∗∗∗ −0.710∗∗∗ −0.706∗∗∗ −0.702∗∗∗ −0.702∗∗∗
(0.856) (0.325) (0.272) (0.268) (0.263) (0.260) (0.256) (0.253) (0.252) (0.250) (0.250)
N 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286
within R2 0.184 0.192 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.197 0.197 0.197 0.197 0.196 0.196
RSS 8433.749 8350.796 8314.283 8312.030 8310.187 8309.065 8308.629 8308.834 8309.152 8309.630 8309.630
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
θ † 2.594 2.358 2.144 1.949 1.611 1.331 1.100 0.900 0.729 0.200 0.001
δˆ † 0.211∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
γˆ † −0.693∗∗∗ −0.683∗∗∗ −0.671∗∗∗ −0.656∗∗∗ −0.621∗∗∗ −0.580∗∗ −0.536∗∗ −0.493∗∗ −0.457∗∗ −0.444∗∗ −0.532∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.246) (0.244) (0.242) (0.239) (0.236) (0.233) (0.231) (0.228) (0.215) (0.206)
N 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286
within R2 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.195 0.194 0.193 0.192 0.191 0.185 0.183
RSS 8310.969 8312.805 8315.103 8317.830 8324.474 8332.594 8341.885 8352.720 8364.726 8423.750 8452.718
† Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 10,000.
Note: The table summarizes estimation results for equation (3.12) depending on the value θ is set to. δˆ denotes the elasticity of wage with respect to the size of the labor markets
where experience was acquired in terms of total regional employment. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses which are clustered by worker. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. All models include control variables as well as worker, industry, occupation, and region-year fixed effects (see table 3.4).
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Table 3.C.3: Estimates of the parameters of the learning function based on different values for θ and reduced sample,
labor market size in terms of total regional employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
θ † 50.000 10.000 5.000 4.595 4.177 3.797 3.452 3.138 2.996 2.853 2.853
δˆ † 0.765∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
γˆ † −4.019∗∗∗ −1.409∗∗∗ −1.103∗∗∗ −1.084∗∗∗ -1.065∗∗∗ −1.047∗∗∗ −1.031∗∗∗ −1.017∗∗∗ −1.010∗∗∗ −1.004∗∗∗ −1.004∗∗∗
(0.962) (0.382) (0.332) (0.328) (0.324) (0.320) (0.316) (0.313) (0.311) (0.309) (0.309)
N 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319
within R2 0.254 0.259 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.260 0.260
RSS 4762.913 4729.010 4719.557 4719.247 4719.119 4719.221 4719.544 4720.074 4720.405 4720.798 4720.798
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
θ † 2.594 2.358 2.144 1.949 1.611 1.331 1.100 0.900 0.729 0.200 0.001
δˆ † 0.219∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
γˆ † −0.991∗∗∗ −0.980∗∗∗ −0.970∗∗∗ −0.961∗∗∗ −0.947∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.934∗∗∗ −0.934∗∗∗ −0.936∗∗∗ −0.960∗∗∗ −0.976∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.303) (0.300) (0.296) (0.290) (0.284) (0.279) (0.274) (0.269) (0.252) (0.245)
N 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319
within R2 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.259 0.259 0.258 0.258 0.257 0.256 0.255
RSS 4721.700 4722.758 4723.953 4725.260 4728.115 4731.146 4734.150 4737.182 4740.100 4751.033 4755.799
† Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 10,000.
Note: The table summarizes estimation results for equation (3.12) depending on the value θ is set to. The estimates are obtained using a reduced sample which do not contain
workers who acquired experience before 1995. δˆ denotes the elasticity of wage with respect to the size of the labor markets where experience was acquired in terms of total regional
employment. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. All models include control variables as well as worker, industry, occupation, and region-year fixed
effects (see table 3.4).
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Table 3.C.4: Estimates of the parameters of the learning function based on different values for θ and full sample,
labor market size in terms of total regional employment and the local share of high-skilled labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
θ † 50.000 10.000 5.000 4.595 4.177 3.797 3.452 3.138 2.996 2.853 2.724
ρˆemp † 0.377∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.038) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
ρˆhskill † 1.385∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.011 0.003 −0.005 −0.012 -0.020 −0.030 −0.036 −0.043 −0.043
(0.240) (0.094) (0.075) (0.073) (0.071) (0.06911) (0.068) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
γˆ † 4.753∗∗∗ 0.250 −0.697 −0.733 −0.767 −0.801 -0.841∗ −0.895∗ −0.928∗∗ −0.968∗∗ −0.968∗∗
(1.676) (0.649) (0.527) (0.516) (0.505) (0.495) (0.485) (0.476) (0.473) (0.469) (0.469)
N 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286
within R2 0.185 0.193 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.197 0.197 0.197 0.197 0.196 0.196
RSS 8432.18 8350.51 8314.28 8312.03 8310.19 8309.06 8308.62 8308.82 8309.14 8309.61 8309.61
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
θ † 2.594 2.358 2.144 1.949 1.611 1.331 1.100 0.900 0.729 0.200 0.001
ρˆemp † 0.230∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.0393
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
ρˆhskill † −0.060 −0.081 −0.106∗ −0.135∗∗ −0.205∗∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ −0.367∗∗∗ −0.445∗∗∗ −0.506∗∗∗ −0.272∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.0603) (0.0609) (0.0618) (0.0659) (0.0644)
γˆ † −1.064∗∗ −1.184∗∗∗ −1.330∗∗∗ −1.499∗∗∗ −1.897∗∗∗ −2.348∗∗∗ −2.802∗∗∗ −3.229∗∗∗ −3.555∗∗∗ −2.086∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗
(0.462) (0.456) (0.451) (0.446) (0.440) (0.435) (0.434) (0.434) (0.435) (0.444) (0.433)
N 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286
within R2 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.195 0.194 0.194 0.193 0.191 0.186 0.183
RSS 8310.92 8312.72 8314.95 8317.57 8323.86 8331.41 8339.93 8349.91 8361.19 8422.85 8451.93
† Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 10,000.
Note: The table summarizes estimation results for equation (3.12) depending on the value θ is set to. Here, labor market size Zs,τ is considered to be an aggregate of total regional
employment and the local share of high-skilled labor, see equation (3.13). ρˆemp denotes the elasticity of wage with respect to the size of the labor markets where experience was
acquired in terms of total regional employment and ρˆhskill the corresponding elasticity with respect to the local share of high-skilled labor where experience was acquired. Robust
standard errors are given in parentheses which are clustered by worker. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. All models include control variables as
well as worker, industry, occupation, and region-year fixed effects (see table 3.4).
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Table 3.C.5: Estimates of the parameters of the learning function based on different values for θ and reduced sample,
labor market size in terms of total regional employment and the local share of high-skilled labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
θ † 50.000 10.000 5.000 4.595 4.177 3.797 3.452 3.138 2.996 2.853 2.724
ρˆemp † 0.291∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.0447) (0.0388) (0.0384) (0.0379) (0.0375) (0.0372) (0.0368) (0.0367) (0.0365) (0.0365)
ρˆhskill † 1.576∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.222∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.178∗ 0.168∗ 0.158∗ 0.158∗
(0.276) (0.113) (0.0983) (0.0973) (0.0964) (0.0955) (0.0947) (0.0940) (0.0937) (0.0934) (0.0934)
γˆ † 5.298∗∗∗ 1.330∗ 0.585 0.489 0.377 0.263 0.148 0.0356 −0.0178 −0.0723 −0.0723
(1.890) (0.762) (0.663) (0.655) (0.648) (0.642) (0.636) (0.630) (0.627) (0.625) (0.625)
N 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319
within R2 0.254 0.259 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.260 0.260
RSS 4761.59 4728.25 4719.16 4718.90 4718.82 4718.97 4719.33 4719.90 4720.25 4720.66 4720.66
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
θ † 2.594 2.358 2.144 1.949 1.611 1.331 1.100 0.900 0.729 0.200 0.001
ρˆemp † 0.178∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.0362) (0.0359) (0.0356) (0.0353) (0.0347) (0.0342) (0.0336) (0.0331) (0.0326) (0.0307) (0.0298)
ρˆhskill † 0.139 0.121 0.106 0.0930 0.0747 0.0662 0.0661 0.0728 0.0844 0.160∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.0927) (0.0921) (0.0915) (0.0909) (0.0897) (0.0885) (0.0873) (0.0861) (0.0849) (0.0799) (0.0775)
γˆ † −0.173 −0.265 −0.345 −0.413 −0.507 −0.548 −0.544 −0.504 −0.437 −0.0117 0.231
(0.620) (0.615) (0.610) (0.605) (0.595) (0.586) (0.577) (0.569) (0.560) (0.527) (0.512)
N 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319
within R2 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.259 0.259 0.258 0.258 0.257 0.256 0.255
RSS 4721.59 4722.68 4723.89 4725.21 4728.08 4731.12 4734.12 4737.15 4740.05 4750.84 4755.47
† Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 10,000.
Note: The table summarizes estimation results for equation (3.12) depending on the value θ is set to. Here, labor market size Zs,τ is considered to be an aggregate of total regional
employment and the local share of high-skilled labor, see equation (3.13). ρˆemp denotes the elasticity of wage with respect to the size of the labor markets where experience was
acquired in terms of total regional employment and ρˆhskill the corresponding elasticity with respect to the local share of high-skilled labor where experience was acquired. Robust
standard errors are given in parentheses which are clustered by worker. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. All models include control variables as
well as worker, industry, occupation, and region-year fixed effects (see table 3.4).
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Table 3.C.6: Estimates of the parameters of the learning function based on different values for θ and full sample,
labor market size in terms of total regional employment, parameters allowed to vary depending on size of labor market where experience is used
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
θ † 50.000 10.000 5.000 4.595 4.177 3.797 3.452 3.138 2.996 2.853 2.853
Now large labor market
∆δˆ † −0.002 −0.047 −0.047∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.046∗∗ −0.045∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.034) (0.021) (0.0206) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
∆γˆ † 1.398 0.903∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
(1.761) (0.439) (0.270) (0.256) (0.240) (0.227) (0.214) (0.202) (0.197) (0.192) (0.192)
Now medium size labor market (reference)
δˆ † 0.703∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.031) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
γˆ † −2.578∗∗ −1.168∗∗∗ −0.936∗∗∗ −0.925∗∗∗ −0.916∗∗∗ −0.908∗∗∗ -0.902∗∗∗ −0.895∗∗∗ −0.892∗∗∗ −0.888∗∗∗ −0.888∗∗∗
(1.176) (0.384) (0.300) (0.294) (0.287) (0.281) (0.276) (0.271) (0.269) (0.267) (0.267)
Now small labor market
∆δˆ † −0.348∗∗ −0.086∗∗ −0.037∗ −0.034 −0.030 −0.027 -0.025 −0.023 −0.022 −0.021 −0.021
(0.146) (0.036) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
∆γˆ † 3.328∗ 0.894∗∗ 0.417 0.382 0.348 0.318 0.293 0.271 0.261 0.252 0.252
(1.745) (0.435) (0.267) (0.252) (0.237) (0.224) (0.211) (0.199) (0.194) (0.189) (0.189)
N 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286
within R2 0.185 0.193 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.197 0.197 0.197 0.197 0.197 0.197
RSS 8430.50 8348.84 8313.46 8311.28 8309.51 8308.44 8308.04 8308.27 8308.60 8309.09 8309.09
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
θ † 2.594 2.358 2.144 1.949 1.611 1.331 1.100 0.900 0.729 0.200 0.001
Now large labor market
∆δˆ † −0.041∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
∆γˆ † 0.549∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.173) (0.165) (0.157) (0.144) (0.134) (0.125) (0.118) (0.112) (0.0928) (0.0860)
Now medium size labor market (reference)
δˆ † 0.226∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
γˆ † −0.879∗∗∗ −0.869∗∗∗ −0.856∗∗∗ −0.840∗∗∗ −0.803∗∗∗ −0.759∗∗∗ −0.713∗∗∗ −0.667∗∗∗ −0.628∗∗∗ −0.601∗∗∗ −0.679∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.260) (0.257) (0.254) (0.249) (0.245) (0.242) (0.239) (0.235) (0.220) (0.211)
Now small labor market
∆δˆ † −0.019 −0.018 −0.017 −0.016 −0.014 −0.014 −0.013 −0.013 −0.0125 −0.0127∗ −0.0125∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
∆γˆ † 0.236 0.222 0.210 0.201 0.186 0.177 0.171 0.169 0.168 0.172∗ 0.170∗∗
(0.179) (0.170) (0.162) (0.155) (0.142) (0.132) (0.123) (0.116) (0.110) (0.091) (0.084)
N 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286
within R2 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.195 0.194 0.193 0.192 0.191 0.186 0.183
RSS 8310.43 8312.27 8314.56 8317.28 8323.90 8331.98 8341.23 8352.02 8363.98 8422.80 8451.70
† Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 10,000.
Note: The table summarizes estimation results for equation (3.12) depending on the value θ is set to. δˆ denotes the elasticity of wage with respect to the size of the labor markets
where experience was acquired in terms of total regional employment. Labor markets with a total number of at least 750,000 employees are considered as large labor markets,
local labor markets with less than 100,000 employees as small labor markets. ∆ refers to the difference in a parameter in comparison to the reference group, i.e. medium size labor
markets. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses which are clustered by worker. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. All models include
control variables as well as worker, industry, occupation, and region-year fixed effects (see table 3.4).
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Table 3.C.7: Estimates of the parameters of the learning function based on different values for θ and reduced sample,
labor market size in terms of total regional employment, parameters allowed to vary depending on size of labor market where experience is used
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
θ † 50.000 10.000 5.000 4.595 4.177 3.797 3.452 3.138 2.996 2.853 2.853
Now large labor market
∆δˆ † 0.010 −0.040 −0.038 −0.038 -0.037 −0.037 −0.036 −0.036∗ −0.036∗ −0.036∗ −0.036∗
(0.151) (0.040) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
∆γˆ † 1.429 0.912∗ 0.680∗∗ 0.656∗∗ 0.632∗∗ 0.610∗∗ 0.589∗∗ 0.571∗∗ 0.562∗∗ 0.554∗∗ 0.554∗∗
(1.983) (0.519) (0.342) (0.328) (0.313) (0.300) (0.288) (0.277) (0.272) (0.267) (0.267)
Now medium size labor market (reference)
δˆ † 0.598∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
γˆ † −2.216∗ −1.161∗∗ −1.001∗∗∗ −0.994∗∗∗ -0.989∗∗∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −0.982∗∗∗ −0.980∗∗∗ −0.979∗∗∗ −0.978∗∗∗ −0.978∗∗∗
(1.334) (0.453) (0.369) (0.363) (0.357) (0.351) (0.345) (0.340) (0.338) (0.335) (0.335)
Now small labor market
∆δˆ † −0.212 −0.039 −0.005 −0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.167) (0.043) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
∆γˆ † 1.570 0.269 −0.012 −0.029 -0.045 −0.058 −0.068 −0.075 −0.078 −0.081 −0.081
(2.000) (0.517) (0.340) (0.326) (0.311) (0.298) (0.286) (0.275) (0.270) (0.265) (0.265)
N 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319
within R2 0.254 0.259 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261
RSS 4760.30 4727.15 4718.60 4718.37 4718.33 4718.51 4718.90 4719.49 4719.84 4720.26 4720.26
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
θ † 2.594 2.358 2.144 1.949 1.611 1.331 1.100 0.900 0.729 0.200 0.001
Now large labor market
∆δˆ † −0.0351∗ −0.0347∗ −0.0343∗ −0.0339∗ −0.0332∗ −0.0326∗∗ −0.0321∗∗ −0.0315∗∗ −0.0311∗∗ −0.0294∗∗ −0.0287∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
∆γˆ † 0.538∗∗ 0.524∗∗ 0.511∗∗ 0.500∗∗ 0.479∗∗ 0.462∗∗ 0.448∗∗ 0.436∗∗ 0.425∗∗ 0.391∗∗ 0.378∗∗
(0.258) (0.250) (0.242) (0.236) (0.224) (0.215) (0.207) (0.200) (0.195) (0.178) (0.172)
Now medium size labor market (reference)
δˆ † 0.217∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
γˆ † −0.977∗∗∗ −0.976∗∗∗ −0.976∗∗∗ −0.976∗∗∗ −0.978∗∗∗ −0.983∗∗∗ −0.990∗∗∗ −0.999∗∗∗ −1.009∗∗∗ −1.056∗∗∗ −1.079∗∗∗
(0.331) (0.326) (0.322) (0.318) (0.310) (0.304) (0.297) (0.292) (0.286) (0.268) (0.260)
Now small labor market
∆δˆ † 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
∆γˆ † −0.084 −0.086 −0.087 −0.087 −0.085 −0.082 −0.079 −0.075 −0.071 −0.059 −0.055
(0.256) (0.248) (0.241) (0.234) (0.223) (0.214) (0.206) (0.200) (0.194) (0.178) (0.171)
N 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319 214,319
within R2 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.259 0.259 0.258 0.258 0.257 0.256 0.255
RSS 4721.21 4722.30 4723.53 4724.86 4727.76 4730.82 4733.84 4736.89 4739.82 4750.76 4755.53
† Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 10,000.
Note: The table summarizes estimation results for equation (3.12) depending on the value θ is set to. The estimates are obtained using a reduced sample which do not contain
workers who acquired experience before 1995. δˆ denotes the elasticity of wage with respect to the size of the labor markets where experience was acquired in terms of total regional
employment. Labor markets with a total number of at least 750,000 employees are considered as large labor markets, local labor markets with less than 100,000 employees as small
labor markets. ∆ refers to the difference in a parameter in comparison to the reference group, i.e. medium size labor markets. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses
which are clustered by worker. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. All models include control variables as well as worker, industry, occupation, and
region-year fixed effects (see table 3.4).
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This dissertation sheds light on two determinants of individual labor productivity. Both refer to the environment
a worker is working in. In the first paper, chapter 2, I focus on the impact of a workforce age structure on indi-
vidual productivity taking into account that differently aged workers complement each other in the production
process. In the second paper, chapter 3, I address that the size of the local labor market in which an individual
works determines productivity. The focus here lies on dynamic agglomeration gains that accumulate over time,
meaning that labor market size enhances the individual accumulation of knowledge and thereby a worker’s
productivity in the future.
The results of the first paper confirm that workers belonging to different age groups are complementary factors.
The analysis is based on a cross sectional linked employer-employee data set from 2012. By estimating translog
cost functions, I show that the degree of complementarity between differently aged workers differs depending
on the age and the skill level of the workers. Complementarities especially arise between younger and middle
aged workers. The highest degree of complementarity is observed between younger high skilled and middle
aged high skilled labor. Model calculations indicate that the shift in the age structure that is expected for Ger-
many will change the relative productivity of age groups. Accordingly, the productivity of younger and middle
aged workers will increase by, respectively, about five percent and three percent, whereas the productivity of
older workers will significantly decline by about nine percent caused by their increasing share in the workforce.
The significant piece of information that changes in a workforce age structure affect (relative) productivity of
differently aged workers should be considered in any discussion of the impact of demographic change, and in
formulating policy that impacts on relative labor supply, such as changes in retirement age.
The results of the second paper strongly indicate that individual productivity significantly depends on the size of
the local labor market in which a worker previously acquired work experience. The analysis uses micro data on
transitions to employment within the period 2005 to 2011 and individual employment biographies from 1975
onwards. My findings suggest that dynamic agglomeration economies in general, and learning externalities
in particular, play an important role in explaining individual labor productivity. Workers accumulate signifi-
cantly more valuable human capital by working in larger local labor markets than by working in smaller ones.
Doubling local employment in all labor markets in which experience was acquired, increases the productivity
of an employee with two years of experience by more than 0.7 percent as reflected in wages. After 10 years
of experience the corresponding gain amounts to about three percent. The identified dynamic agglomeration
economies are supposed to reflect in the local wage level since workers are rather immobile between local labor
markets that differ in size. Therefore, my results provide additional evidence as to why significant regional
wage disparities between urban and non-urban labor markets exist in many countries.
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